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Abstract 
In this study, we derive a poverty-minimizing allocation rule, based on which we assess the poverty-
efficiency of actual aid allocations, with a special focus on the comparative impact of new donors 
and new non-aid flows. The results suggest a substantial misallocation of aid. Our benchmark 
estimates indicate that donors should reallocate nearly half the total aid budget from aid darlings 
(countries receiving more aid than the allocation rule specifies) to aid orphans (countries receiving 
less aid than the allocation rule specifies). The estimated poverty-reducing efficiency varies 
considerably across donors. Whereas new global actors such as the Gates foundation perform well 
above average, the non-DAC bilateral donors perform clearly worse. Overall, neither the new donors 
nor the new financial flows alleviate the observed misallocation of aid. While the new donors stand 
for a non-negligible share of overall poverty reduction, together they perform below average in terms 
of poverty reduction per aid dollar. Similarly, rather than counteracting the relative neglect of 
countries identified as particularly underfunded in terms of aid, the non-aid financial flows add to 
the inequitable distribution. Based on an extensive battery of alternative model calibrations, we 
establish upper and lower bounds on our estimates, allowing for clear policy recommendations. 
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Among official donor objectives, poverty reduction takes center stage. In 2015, world leaders 
adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. On top of its list of goals is the 
objective to ‘end poverty in all its forms everywhere’ (United Nations, 2019b). No less grand 
is the World Bank’s mission, carved in stone at their Washington headquarters: ‘Our Dream is 
a World Free of Poverty’ (World Bank, 2019). While priorities vary across bilateral donors, 
the overarching objective of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's 
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), consisting of 30 influential donors, is to 
contribute to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and thus its goal to end poverty. Yet, 
despite being roughly ten times richer in per capita terms, Tunisia receives nearly five times as 
much foreign aid per person than the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
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 This is not necessarily surprising. The allocation of aid among countries clearly reflects 
multiple objectives, some legitimate, others arguably less so. Aid may be used to rebuild post-
conflict societies and to meet humanitarian emergencies, or for that matter, to reward allies, 
punish enemies, build coalitions and more generally support the strategic or commercial 
interests of the donor (Collier and Dollar, 2002; Dreher et al., 2018). Indeed, ample evidence 
from the last couple of decades suggests that when allocating aid across countries, donors tend 
to be motivated as much by political strategy and economic interests, as by the needs and policy 
performance of the recipient countries (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 
2002; Dollar and Levin, 2006; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Hoeffler and Outram, 2011; 
Dreher et al., 2018.) Justifiable or not, this allocation pattern goes against the official donor 
emphasis on poverty reduction. 
 At the same time, however, the aid landscape has changed dramatically over the period: 
new sources of development finance have emerged and the development cooperation arena has 
seen continued diversification of actors, instruments and delivery mechanisms (Kharas and 
Rogerson, 2012; Mawdsley et al, 2014). The role of traditional official development assistance 
(ODA) in development cooperation is becoming less dominant (OECD, 2014). In parallel, the 
dominance of aid from the OECD-DAC countries is declining, with recent years seeing a sharp 
increase in development finance from non-Western donors, with China at the forefront (see 
e.g. Strange et al., 2015; Dreher et al., 2011; Dreher et al., 2015). The changing circumstances 
call for a renewed focus on the implications and challenges of development cooperation in 
general, and for an understanding of the implications of the rise of new actors and financial 
flows in particular.  
 The aim of this paper is to derive a poverty-minimizing – or poverty-efficient – allocation 
of aid and, based on this, assess the poverty-efficiency of actual aid allocations, with a special 
focus on the comparative impact of new donors and new (non-aid) financial flows on the most 
under-funded countries. We first look at aggregate flows, and ask how much poverty could be 
reduced if aid was allocated according to the specified rule. Next, we break down the analysis 
by donor groups and flow types and assess the poverty-efficiency of the respective allocations. 
On the recipient side, we identify winners and losers – aid darlings and aid orphans – and assess 
to what extent new donors and new financial flows (NFFs) contribute to a more or less poverty-
efficient allocation.  
 The results suggest a substantial misallocation of aid. Our benchmark estimates indicate 
that donors should reallocate nearly half the total aid budget from darling to orphan countries. 
The estimated poverty-reducing efficiency varies considerably across donors. In terms of 
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average poverty reduction per aid dollar, new global actors such as the Gates foundation 
perform well above average and the non-DAC bilateral donors clearly below. Overall, neither 
the new donors nor the new financial flows alleviate the observed misallocation of aid. While 
the new donors stand for a non-negligible share of overall poverty reduction, together they 
perform below average in terms of poverty reduction per aid dollar. Similarly, rather than 
counteracting the relative neglect of the particularly underfunded countries in the allocation of 
aid, the non-aid financial flows add to the inequitable distribution. For the countries that we 
identify as aid orphans, these flows are not significant enough to substitute for the lack of aid. 
 Previous studies in this vein, e.g. the seminal work of Collier and Dollar (2001 and 2002), 
demonstrate that the actual allocation of aid is radically different from the poverty-efficient 
allocation, and thus that reallocating aid can come with significant improvements in terms of 
poverty reduction. Our contribution to this literature is twofold. 
 First, given the changing aid landscape, we incorporate new donors and new (non-aid) 
financial flows into the poverty minimizing aid allocation literature, investigating explicitly 
how these donors and flows matter for the poor underfunded countries. NFF is clearly a very 
heterogeneous category including flows that take place for widely different reasons. As such, 
NFFs are not directly comparable to aid, and we thus cannot apply the same analytical 
framework as that used to assess the poverty reducing efficiency of aid (see Section 2 and 3). 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to explore the distributional profiles of the new financial flows, 
and in particular, whether they help counteract the observed misallocation of aid. 
 We thus base our estimations on a more comprehensive dataset than previous studies. In 
particular, we compile aid data for a large group of new donors and on alternative sources of 
development finance. On top of the traditional multilateral and DAC bilateral donors, we 
incorporate a wide range of non-DAC bilateral donors,1 as well as a group of donors that are 
DAC members today, but were not for most of the period we study (2009-2013).2 Moreover, 
we include data on a wide range of non-aid NFFs, namely ‘Other Official Flows’, Personal 
remittances, FDI, as well as on aid from International NGOs and new global actors.3 
 Second, acknowledging that optimal aid allocation estimations are sensitive to model 
calibrations and different measures of need, we thoroughly investigate how robust our 
 
1 Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the 
United Arab Emirates. 
2 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. 
3 The following new global actors are included: The Bill and Melinda Gates Fund (BMGF), The Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), 
and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
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benchmark results are to alternative calibrations and measures. Based on this, we establish 
upper and lower bounds on our estimates, allowing for more solid policy recommendations.  
 
 2 Optimal aid allocation 
 
In their simplest form, optimal aid allocation rules tend to consider two characteristics of 
recipient countries: their need for aid and their ability to use it (Carter, 2014). The literature 
has to a large extent been built around the pioneering work of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), 
who in line with this, argue that aid should be allocated to countries that are poor and well-
governed. They propose that aid should be distributed so as to maximize poverty reduction, via 
growth. Based on a growth regression (in turn based on Burnside and Dollar, 2000), they 
estimate that aid is more efficient at reducing poverty when government effectiveness is higher. 
Hence, according to their logic, holding the level of poverty constant, aid should increase with 
policy, and holding policy constant, it should increase with poverty. 
 The idea that the effect of aid is conditional on the institutional/political framework in the 
recipient country (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2001, 2002) has been 
influential in donor circles. Notably, however, comparatively little weight is given to poverty. 
Consider the ‘Performance Based Allocation’ (PBA) rule used by the World Bank (and other 
multilateral development banks) to allocate its concessional International Development 
Association (IDA) funds. Funds are allocated based on performance (CPR) and income (GNI) 
per capita: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 =  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎−0.125 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 
CPR is a country performance rating focusing on macroeconomic management, structural 
policies, social policies, public sector management and institutions, and the quality of 
management of IDA’s projects and programs.4 Need is taken into account via the fact that IDA 
is only given to countries with a GNI/cap below a certain threshold. But apart from that, 
overwhelming weight is given to performance, or the institutional/policy environment of the 
recipient country. While the weight given to CPR has in fact been reduced (the exponent has 
 
4 Specifically, the CPR is calculated as follows: 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.24𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶 + 0.68𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 + 0.08𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, where the 
country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) index is based on indicators focusing on (A) macroeconomic 
management, (B) structural policies, (C) social policies, and (D) public sector management and institutions, and 
PPR is the IDA portfolio performance rating. As one can see, the cluster focusing on institutions and public sector 
management is given the highest weight. 
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been lowered in steps from 5 to 3) over the last couple of years in order to increase the poverty-
orientation of the formula (IDA, 2016), the rule is still very much performance focused.  
 While very influential, the optimal aid allocation rule of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) 
has been criticized on several grounds (for an overview, see Sterck et al., 2017). Below we 
discuss proposed developments that we seek to incorporate in our allocation formula.  
 
 2.1 An uncomfortable trade-off between need and effectiveness 
 
First, the objective function of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) can, just as the PBA rule of the 
World Bank, be criticized on fairness grounds. As noted by McGillivray and Pham (2017, p. 
1) it contains an “uncomfortable trade-off between need and effectiveness”. The poorest 
countries often have the lowest levels of performance and are thus allocated less aid.  
 To begin with, one could question the overwhelming weight given to performance, or 
policy/institutional environment, in the PBA rule. In the aid effectiveness literature, the leading 
proponents of the view that the impact of aid is conditional on policy are Burnside and Dollar, 
who in an often-cited study from the turn of the millennium (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) found 
that aid has a positive effect on growth only in countries with sound fiscal, monetary and trade 
policies. As noted, Collier and Dollar’s allocation rule (2001, 2002) is based on this estimation. 
The Burnside and Dollar results were later called into question, however, and have been found 
to be sensitive to specification and sample (Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Easterly, 2003; Easterly et 
al., 2004; Dalgaard et al.; 2004; Roodman, 2007). In more recent accounts, the consensus is 
rather that the aggregate aid-growth literature offers no empirical evidence of aid effectiveness 
being conditional on policy (Arndt et al., 2010; Clemens et al., 2012; Bourguignon and 
Gunning, 2016; Guillaumont, et al., 2017; Mekasha and Tarp, 2019).  
 A lack of aggregate evidence of aid effectiveness being conditional on policy should of 
course not be interpreted as the recipient country policy environment being irrelevant; few 
researchers and practitioners would dispute the merits of a sound policy environment. That 
said, though, an aid allocation rule placing a significantly higher weight on the policy 
dimension compared to the need dimension can hardly be motivated with reference to the 
empirical literature on the relationship between aid and growth. 
 Furthermore, one can argue that poor countries should not receive less aid due to structural 
handicaps beyond their control. Llavador and Roemer (2001) propose an equality of 
opportunity approach to aid allocation, arguing that poor countries should not to be penalized 
for a growth-adverse environment for which they cannot be deemed responsible. According to 
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this line of thinking, aid should compensate countries for inherited disadvantages while 
allowing effort to produce differential rewards. Cogneau and Naudet (2007) also adopt an equal 
opportunities approach, but argue that aid should focus on equalizing future poverty risks 
across developing countries. Similarly, Wood (2008, p. 1135) argues that, “donors and people 
care—for intellectually and morally defensible reasons—about both current and future levels 
of poverty”, and therefore propose to minimize the discounted sum of future poverty, rather 
than, as Collier and Dollar, current poverty. 
 Relatedly, but focusing on how these ideas have been put to use among donors in practice, 
Guillaumont et al. (2017a,b) argue that the performance based allocation rule of the World 
Bank fails to take account of key structural handicaps to development facing countries 
independent of present political will and efforts. In its current form, the PBA rule does not 
allow countries performing badly due to e.g. conflict or natural disasters to receive a level of 
aid in accordance with their needs. Rather, considering that ‘performance’, as measured in the 
PBA, is likely to be pro-cyclical, the impact of a negative exogenous shock will according to 
this allocation rule be magnified by lower aid. Instead of incorporating vulnerability into their 
allocation formula, the World Bank currently makes exceptions to the PBA rule, offering 
special treatment to different categories of fragile states. Similarly, Guillaumont and co-authors 
argue that low levels of human capital is a structural handicap that a country should not be 
penalized for. Despite the best of intentions and significant efforts, countries with low levels 
of human capital are likely to score poorly on the PBA.  
 On top of fairness considerations, an allocation rule that better captures the vulnerability 
of recipient countries can be justified with reference to efficiency. Exogenous sources of 
instability, and the growth volatility they induce, lowers average growth and is harmful to poor 
and vulnerable groups (Guillaumont and Wagner, 2013). The stabilizing impact of aid – i.e. 
that it dampens the negative impact of exogenous shocks on growth and development – should 
increase growth as well as make it more pro-poor (Guillaumont et al. (2017a,b). Similarly, not 
penalizing countries with low levels of human capital can be motivated in terms of efficiency. 
Aid tends to have a knowledge content and is often targeted at human capital development, and 
it is reasonable to argue that the marginal impact of aid on growth via human capital will be 
higher when the initial level of human capital is lower. 
 The implication of these arguments is, according to Guillaumont et al. (2017a), that the 
marginal poverty reduction per aid dollar is higher in countries with high vulnerability and low 
human capital. For this reason, they propose the use of an ‘augmented PBA’ where the 
measurement of performance by policy indicators is adjusted for the impact of structural 
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handicaps, namely vulnerability and low human capital. Specifically, they propose an 
‘Augmented Country Policy Rating’ (ACPR) that is a weighted average of the original CPR 
and the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and Human Assets Index (HAI) used by the UN 
to identify LDCs. EVI is a composite index capturing the exposure to natural or external 
exogenous chocks. HAI is a composite index of health and educational components. The higher 
ACPR, the higher is the presumed aid effectiveness. Therefore, in an optimal aid allocation, 
countries with high poverty and high ACPR should be favored. 
 To integrate structural economic vulnerability and low human capital into the allocation 
formula we will follow Guillaumont et al. (2017a) and use the ACPR as policy measure in our 
benchmark calibration, but will also evaluate how sensitive the results are to using CPR instead 
of ACPR.  
 
 2.2 Focusing on growth or consumption 
 
Another concern has to do with the focus on growth. As noted, Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002) 
use an estimated empirical relationship between aid and growth to derive an allocation rule that 
maximizes poverty reduction via growth. This can be questioned on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. 
 Arguing that aid can only reduce poverty by increasing growth has been criticized for 
being ‘reductionist’ and not ‘sufficiently nuanced’ (McGillivray and Pham, 2017). In 
particular, giving no weight to aid-funded consumption and investment is arguably problematic 
considering that most aid does not have growth as its main purpose, but rather private and 
public consumption and investment intended to be welfare enhancing in itself.  
 An alternative is to derive an allocation that seeks to maximize recipient welfare rather 
than growth (Carter, 2014). In line with Bourguignon and Platteau (2017), one can focus on 
aid-consumption, i.e. the effect aid has directly on consumption, instead of aid-growth-
consumption, i.e. the effect aid has on growth, and the effect aid has on consumption via 
growth. 
 Empirically, there are also reasons to focus on consumption rather than growth. While the 
aggregate effect of aid on growth is difficult to measure, yielding fragile estimates (see 
Clemens et al. 2012); it is easier to show that aid increases consumption and welfare ‘there and 
then on the ground’ (the so called micro-macro paradox). This is not to say that there is no 
effect of aid on economic growth. Even though endogeneity concerns and low statistical power 
make it difficult to get reliable estimates, the most ambitious attempts (see Clemens et al. 2012) 
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suggests that there is indeed a positive impact. Nevertheless, considering a more direct effect 
of aid rather than its effect via growth appears warranted.  
 As it turns out, the Collier and Dollar (2002) model is easily extended to allow aid to have 
a direct effect on income. Doing so, we assume that an increase in national income resulting 
from an inflow of aid trickles down to the poor in the same way as would an increase in national 
income instead resulting from growth, which appears reasonable.  
 
 2.3 Diminishing returns to aid 
 
Assuming that aid has diminishing returns is standard in the optimal aid allocation literature. 
The argument is that recipient countries, due to e.g. institutional constraints, have limited 
absorptive capacity, i.e. ability to absorb and use aid in a way that achieves a given objective. 
With large aid volumes, a recipient country will thus reach a point where they can no longer 
absorb or spend aid efficiently. 
 The existence of diminishing returns is a robust finding in the aid-growth literature (see 
e.g. Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Hansen and Tarp, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Easterly et al., 
2004; Clemens et al 2012). Specifically, these results indicate that aid is positively related to 
growth up to a certain level of aid relative to recipient GDP – often referred to as the saturation 
point – and even negatively related thereafter. Considering the robustness of this finding, the 
question is not so much whether to assume diminishing returns, but rather to specify the 
saturation point. Below we develop our theoretical framework, discussing theoretical 
assumptions like this one.  
 
 3 Theoretical framework 
 
In this section, we derive a poverty minimizing allocation of aid. Our model builds on the 
pioneering work of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), but incorporates a number of 
developments discussed in Section 2. In particular, rather than deriving an allocation rule that 
maximizes poverty reduction via growth, we allow aid to have a direct effect on income, while 
taking into account that aid has diminishing returns in terms of poverty reduction.5 Having 
 
5 Worth emphasizing, the below framework applies to aid rather than new financial flows. We return to the NFFs 




derived a poverty minimizing allocation of aid, we are able to compare actual aid levels to 
optimal aid levels among aid receiving countries. Hence, in a next step, we assess the poverty 
reduction that donors could hypothetically achieve by reallocating aid from darling countries 
(that have received more aid than our allocation rule recommends) to orphan countries (that 
have received less aid than our allocation rule recommends). Finally, we break down the 
analysis by donors / donor groups and assess their comparative poverty reducing efficiency. 
 
 3.1 Deriving the poverty minimizing allocation of aid 
 
Collier and Dollar (2002) formulate a model assuming that the objective function of donors is 
to allocate aid among countries so as to 
 Max poverty reduction ∑ 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ℎ𝑖𝑖0𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 (1) 
 subject to          ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,            𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is GDP per capita in in country i, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is aid/GDP, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is population, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 is the growth 
rate of per capita income, ℎ𝑖𝑖0 is a measure of initial (before aid) poverty, and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the (negative) 
elasticity of poverty with respect to income. The total amount of aid is denoted 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡. 
 As discussed in Section 2, deriving an aid allocation rule that maximizes poverty reduction 
via growth can be questioned on both theoretical and empirical grounds. As also noted, 
however, one can easily extend the Collier and Dollar (2002) setup to allow aid to have a direct 
effect on national income. Recall that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 is the income elasticity of poverty. Income, in this 
context, can refer to any income. An increase in national income has an effect on poverty, no 
matter if this change in income is due to growth, or to an inflow of aid.  
 Against this background, we now depart from the Collier and Dollar setup. In particular, 
instead of letting aid affect poverty only via growth, we formulate a model considering the 
direct effect of aid on income (which allows public and private consumption) and thereby on 
poverty. From an accounting perspective, the effect of aid on income is straightforward. Aid 
simply constitutes an inflow of resources that adds to the recipient country’s pre-aid-income. 
We slightly modify this perspective and consider ‘realized income’, taking into account that 
aid has diminishing returns. One way to put this is that an increasing fraction of the aid received 
is lost due to transaction costs. The aid that remains, net of transaction costs, adds to the 
recipient country’s pre-aid-income, and forms realized income. Just as the standard assumption 
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of diminishing returns in the aid-growth literature, we thus assume a quadratic relationship 
between aid and realized income, i.e. that recipient country governments have limited 
absorptive capacity when it comes to delivering consumption (realized per capita income), just 
as in delivering economic growth.  
 Hence, with large aid volumes, a recipient country will reach a point where they can no 
longer absorb or spend aid efficiently. Indeed, after this point aid even has a negative effect. 
Denoting this saturation point 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, and the fraction of the first aid-dollar that is not lost due to 
transaction costs 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, realized per capita income, denoted 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖, is given by: 
 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (2) 
Where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖is the factor for the aid – realized per capita income relationship: 
 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 = 1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 −
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2
2𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖
� (3)  
Like Collier and Dollar, we let 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 vary with policy. For a more detailed discussion of 
the functional form and calibration of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, see Appendix B. Under ideal policy conditions, 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 would equal one, implying that none of the first aid-dollar is lost due to transaction costs. In 
our benchmark calibration, we assume that the saturation point for a country with average 
policy score, denoted 𝛽𝛽0, occurs when aid constitutes 25 percent of GDP. We base this figure 
on the estimates in Clemens et al (2012), who find inflection points for the aid-growth 
relationship when aid exceeds about 20-25 percent of GDP (which we adjust for differences in 
aid flow coverage and for our use of commitments rather than disbursements). As such, we 
assume that the saturation point for consumption-aid is the same as for growth-aid. We are not 
aware of any equivalent estimates for consumption-aid, and it is arguably reasonable that the 
amount of aid a recipient country can handle gives a similar pattern of diminishing returns for 
different economic outcomes. In the robustness analysis, we explore the sensitivity of results 
to using alternative saturation points. 
 Poverty (post aid), denoted ℎ𝑖𝑖, is a function of realized per capita income, assuming a 
constant realized per capita income elasticity of poverty: 





  (4) 
 Furthermore, we assume that 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼, i.e., that the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
realized per capita income is the same in all countries. Since the empirical estimates of 
elasticities tend to vary considerably based on the poverty measure used (e.g. based on the 
specific poverty line chosen and whether using a headcount measure or and indicator capturing 
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the depth of poverty), we argue that it is more transparent to use the same elasticity across the 
board. Based on previous empirical studies (e.g. Bourguignon, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; 
Bigsten and Shimeles, 2007) we use 𝛼𝛼=1.5 in the benchmark calibration, but explore the 
sensitivity of results to using alternative elasticities (𝛼𝛼=1 and 𝛼𝛼=2).6 
 Equations (2) – (4) allow us to write the poverty function of country i as: 






We frame the optimization problem as one of minimizing poverty rather than, as Collier and 
Dollar (2012), of maximizing poverty reduction. Hence, the objective function for donors is to 
allocate aid among countries so as to: 
 Min total poverty  ∑ ℎ𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (6) 
 subject to                ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡,            𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0 
Our formulation takes into account that aid has diminishing returns on poverty not only through 
the quadratic relationship between aid and national income, but also through the poverty 
function being a decreasing but convex function of national income (taking into account the 
aid portion of national income). This contrasts with the set up used in Collier and Dollar (2002), 
and in most of this literature, where the convexity of the poverty function is ignored, and 
poverty reduction achieved from growth in country i is assumed to be given by 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑖0𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖. With 
low levels of growth, this is a fairly accurate approximation of the correct expression 
�1 − 1(1+𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖)𝛼𝛼� ℎ𝑖𝑖
0𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖, assuming that the elasticity is constant. Using this approximation, one can 
solve the first order conditions algebraically and thus derive an explicit expression for the 
solution. The higher the growth level, however, the more imprecise this approximation 
becomes.7 By framing the optimization problem as one of minimizing poverty rather than 
maximizing poverty reduction, we avoid the above approximation, and thereby take the 
convexity of the poverty function into account and obtain more precise estimates. Without the 
approximation, however, there exists no algebraic solution to the first order conditions, and we 
must rely on numerical solutions. To our knowledge, this is the first aid effectiveness model to 
 
6 For a more detailed discussion of 𝛼𝛼, see Appendix B. 
7 Consider the following extreme but illustrative example: if 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 0.3 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 4, then the poverty reduction 
according to this expression is 120 percent of the initial poverty, implying that the new poverty level is negative. 
12 
 
incorporate both diminishing returns to aid and that poverty is a decreasing but convex function 
of national income. 
 If we consider, to start with, only interior solutions (in which each country gets some aid), 
the first order conditions for a minimum are: 
 𝜕𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 (7) 
Drawing on equation (5), we can rewrite the first order conditions as follows: 
  −ℎ𝑖𝑖0𝛼𝛼𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 �1 −
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖





= 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖                  (8) 
As already mentioned, Equation 8 has no algebraic solution. However, since we know the 
budget constraint (total aid, 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡, is $149.4bn in our data), we can numerically solve for the 
vector of optimal aid levels {𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗} (now allowing for corner solutions). 
 Next, we assess the poverty reduction that donors could hypothetically achieve by 
reallocating aid from darling countries (that have received more aid than our allocation rule 
recommends) to orphan countries (that have received less aid than our allocation rule 
recommends).  
 
 3.2 Poverty reduction when reallocating aid from darlings to orphans  
 
Consider the poverty reduction of aid allocated to a particular country.  We let 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 denote aid to 
country i. 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 thus have the following relationship: 
 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 (9) 
We denote the marginal poverty reduction of aid, i.e. the extra poverty reduction achieved by 







Now consider the aid reallocation that would take place if going from the actual to the optimal 
aid allocation. 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0 and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖0 refer to actual aid allocated to country i, and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗ and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖∗ refer to the 
optimal amount of aid country i should get according to our poverty minimizing allocation rule. 
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𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 refers to the average 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 of the aid that would be reallocated to/from country i when 







0  (11) 
Using equation (5) and (9) we can re-write this expression as:   




















0  (12) 
The gain in poverty reduction achieved by the aid reallocated to orphans is ∑ ((𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗ −𝑖𝑖∈𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0) × 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), and the loss in poverty reduction as a result of the aid reallocated from 
darlings is ∑ ((𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖∗) × 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖∈𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎 . The total lost poverty reduction from aid 
reallocated from the darlings, as percentage of the total gained poverty reduction from the aid 












 3.3 Poverty reducing efficiency across donors 
 
Next, we distinguish between donor groups and put a value on the poverty reducing efficiency 
of each donor. Specifically, we calculate the total poverty reduction of aid from each donor, in 
relation to the volume of total aid given by that donor. Doing so, we get a measure of the 
average poverty reduction per aid dollar for each donor.  
 Consider what the marginal poverty reduction of aid (𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖) is on average for all aid given to 
country i.  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖





0  (14) 















0  (15) 
14 
 
Now consider the aid given by a specific donor j to country i, denoted 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗. The total poverty 
reduction of all aid given to country i is 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 × 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅. Dividing this poverty reduction between 
donors based on the amount of aid given by each donor suggests that the poverty reduction in 
country i from aid given by donor j is 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 × 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅. 










This is the total poverty reduction from aid from donor j, in relation to the volume of total aid 
given by that donor. In other words, it is a measure of average poverty reduction per aid dollar. 
We finally normalize 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 by dividing it by 𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑂𝑂𝑎𝑎 and multiplying the ratio by 100, denoting 
the normalized poverty-reducing efficiency 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁.  
 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁 = 100
𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗
𝜌𝜌𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
  (17) 
This means that, for instance, 𝜌𝜌𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁  = 166.3 shall be interpreted as Canada’s aid being 66.3 
percent more effective at reducing poverty than average aid. 
 
 4 Data and empirical estimation 
 
In the previous section, we derived a poverty efficient allocation of aid. The next step is to 
assess the poverty-efficiency of actual aid allocations. As noted, we will first look at aggregate 
flows, and ask how much poverty could be reduced if aid was allocated according to the 
specified rule. Next, we break down the analysis by donor groups and flow types and assess 
the poverty-efficiency of the respective allocations, with a special focus on the comparative 
impact of new donors and new non-aid flows.  
       As noted, we find optimal aid using a numerical solution to the first order condition 
specified in equation (8).8  For this purpose, we need data on aid flows, poverty and policy, as 
well as other development outcomes. To begin with, we compile a large amount of aid data, 
grouping the included donors into two main categories. First, we refer to the traditional donors, 
that is bilateral DAC donors, the EC, UN, WB, IMF, Regional Development Banks, and other 
 
8 To find the numerical solutions, we use a loop within a loop (based on the Newton-Raphson method) in Stata.  
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multilateral donors (except Vertical Funds),9 as well as to non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) as ‘old aid’. Second, we classify the bilateral non-DAC donors and New Global Actors 
(specifically, the Bill and Melinda Gates Fund and Vertical funds) as ‘new donors’. 
 With respect to the first category, the data on aid from the traditional multilateral and DAC 
bilateral donors is from the AidData Research Release 3.1 dataset (AidData, 2017a). Part of 
the data on aid from International NGOs is from Koch et al. (2009). While this data includes 
only a subset of NGOs, it is to our knowledge the most recent and comprehensive dataset on 
aid from international NGOs. In addition, we have compiled novel data (covering 2009-2013) 
on aid from Doctors without borders (MSF) and from the International Red Cross (ICRC), 
directly from the organizations in question (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2014; International Committee of the Red Cross, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).  
 The AidData Research Release 3.1 dataset (AidData, 2017a) also contains data on aid from 
a great number of non-DAC bilateral donors,10 and from the New Global Actors, relevant for 
our second category, ‘new donors’. The data on aid from the non-DAC bilateral donors China, 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are from separate datasets, however (AidData 2014a, 2014b, 2017b). 
Since these countries do not release official, project-level financial information about its 
foreign aid activities, this data is based on an open-source media based data collection 
technique that triangulates project information across a range of data sources.11  Finally, data 
on aid from the non-DAC bilateral donors Bulgaria, Croatia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkey is from OECD-DAC (2020), since data on these flows is not available from AidData.  
 When possible, we focus on average (Commitments in Current USD) Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) 2009-2013. In order to qualify as ODA, an aid flow must be 
concessional, have a grant element of at least 25 percent, and its main objective should be the 
promotion of economic development of developing countries (OECD, 2016). For China, Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar we focus on flows judged as ‘ODA-like’ by AidData coders (see Strange et 
 
9 Vertical funds are development financing mechanisms focused on single development domains and drawing on 
mixed funding sources (Future UN Development System, 2015). The following Vertical Funds are included: The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI), and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). 
10 Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and the 
United Arab Emirates. We also classify the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia as Non-DAC bilateral donors, since these countries were not DAC-members for most of the period under 
study (2009-2013). 
11 While information from public media outlets is of course an imperfect substitute for complete statistical data 
from official sources, Strange et al. (2017) provide a careful description of how they dealt with challenges in the 




al., 2017). In other cases, (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hungary, India, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Monaco, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand) ODA-status is not specified. In cases 
when a donor lacks data on aid flows for some year/s 2009-2013, we use an average of as many, 
and as recent, years as possible. We include only flows that actually constitute a transfer of 
money or resources from the donor country to the recipient country, meaning that we exclude 
e.g. ‘Administrative Costs of Donors’, ‘Action Relating to Debt’, ‘Refugees in Donor 
Countries’, ‘Scholarships/training in the donor country’ and ‘Promotion of development 
awareness’. 
 On the recipient side, we include the countries part of the DAC list of ODA recipients 
(OECD, 2021) for at least one of the years 2009-2013. We exclude regional aid that cannot be 
tied to a specific recipient country. Furthermore, we exclude India as an aid recipient since the 
country, while receiving aid, is simultaneously a major emerging donor. After sample 
restrictions, we end up with a total sum of 149.4 billion USD that donors could seek to allocate 
optimally.  
 Considering the changing aid landscape, where the role of traditional ODA is becoming 
less dominant (OECD, 2014), we also explore the role of non-aid flows for the poor 
underfunded countries. In particular, we consider ‘Other Official Flows’ (OOF), transactions 
by the official sector which do not meet the previously described conditions for eligibility as 
ODA, obtained from AidData, and personal remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI), 
obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI, World Bank, 2019b).  
 To assess the poverty reducing efficiency of actual aid allocation patterns, we need data 
on poverty. In our benchmark estimations, we use a poverty index based on GNI (PPP adjusted) 
per capita, obtained from the WDI (World Bank, 2019b). The rationale for this is partly that 
richer countries with high poverty should be held accountable for their unequal distribution of 
income (Sterck et al., 2017; Bigsten and Tengstam, 2015), and partly the relative robustness of 
the indicator (poverty rates tend to vary considerably based on the specific indicator used). In 
the sensitivity analysis, we nevertheless use headcount poverty, $1.90 (PPP) a day as well as 
$3.10 (PPP) a day as alternative measures (also from WDI).  
 To incorporate policy, while taking into account structural economic vulnerability and low 
human capital (see the discussion in Section 2.1), we use the augmented CPR (ACPR) proposed 
by Guillaumont et al. (2017a) in our benchmark calibration. As noted, the ACPR is a weighted 
average of the original CPR of the World Bank and the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) 
and Human Assets Index (HAI) used by the UN to identify LDCs (United Nations, 2019a). In 
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the robustness analysis, however, we also run estimations using the standard country 
performance rating (CPR) of the World Bank (IDA, 2017b). 
 We obtain figures on GDP per capita and population from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank, 2019b). Finally, we use a group of indicators to find predicted values 
of variables for which we have missing values. For a summary of variable definitions and data 
sources, see Table A1, and for descriptive statistics of key variables, see Tables A2-A5. 
 Among the aid recipient countries, we identify aid darlings and aid orphans, and assess to 
what extent new donors and non-aid flows contribute to a more or less poverty-efficient 
allocation. An ‘aid orphan’ here refers to a country that receives less aid than our allocation 
rule recommends. To reduce poverty more effectively, the donor community should scale up 
aid to these countries. Correspondingly, an ‘aid darling’ is a country that gets more aid than 
our allocation rule recommends, implying that the donor community should scale down aid to 
these countries. 
 While we present what may seem like exact figures, it is important to remember that 
optimal aid allocation estimations are sensitive to using different model specifications and 
measures. To get a sense of the sensitivity of our benchmark findings, we perform a battery of 
robustness checks. As noted, these entail using different elasticities of poverty with respect to 
income (𝛼𝛼) and different aid/GDP saturation points for a nation with average policy (𝛽𝛽0), as 
well as incorporating and measuring policy and poverty in several different ways.  
 Using three different values for 𝛼𝛼 (1.0 and 2.0, on top of the benchmark value of 1.5) as 
well as for 𝛽𝛽0 (20 and 30 percent on top of the 25 percent benchmark) gives nine (3 x 3) 
different calibrations. With respect to poverty, on top of a poverty index based on GNI/cap 
(PPP) we also use the headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (PPP), respectively. For policy, 
we use CPR as an alternative to ACPR. Finally, we incorporate policy using three different 
policy factors.12 In total, this gives 162 (3x3x3x3x2) different calibrations. For the sake of 
brevity, we present only the extreme values obtained for each recipient country, which we 
interpret as upper and lower bounds on their estimates. This also allows us to present upper and 
lower bounds for the estimates in the analysis by donor groups. 
 Based on these, we modify the above darling/orphan classification. Countries that are 
orphans (i.e. receive less aid than the allocation rule specifies) in all calibrations we refer to as 
‘pure orphans’, and countries that are darlings (i.e. receive more aid than the allocation rule 
 
12 Drawing on Collier and Dollar (2002) we use a benchmark ‘policy factor’ of 0.67, and the alternative policy 
factors 0.38 and 1.06 in the robustness analysis (see Appendix B for details). 
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specifies) in all calibrations we refer to as ‘pure darlings’. Countries that are orphans in the 
benchmark calibration, but darlings in some robustness calibration/s we refer to as ‘borderline 
orphans’, and correspondingly, countries that are darlings in the benchmark calibration, but 
orphans in some calibration/s we refer to as ‘borderline darlings’. 
  
 5 Results 
 
In this section, we assess the poverty-efficiency of actual aid allocations. First, we consider 
aggregate flows, and ask how much poverty could be reduced if aid was allocated according to 
the specified rule. Second, we break down the analysis by donor groups and flow types and 
assess the poverty-efficiency of the respective allocations, with a special focus on the 
comparative impact of new donors and new non-aid flows. Finally, we assess to what extent 
new donors and non-aid flows contribute to a more or less poverty-efficient allocation. 
  
 5.1 Benchmark results 
 
Looking at Figure 1, we can note that there is no clear negative relationship between aid per 
capita and GNI (PPP) per capita among aid receiving countries. Hence, in line with our 
introductory discussion, there is no indication that the poorest countries in the sample receive 
most aid and that the richest countries receive least aid. Rather, there is great variation in the 
amount of aid received among the very poor (compare e.g. Mozambique and the DRC) as well 
as among the relatively rich (compare e.g. Tunisia and Peru). While Figure 1 is purely 
descriptive – in particular, it does not incorporate the role of policy – it demonstrates that there 
are winners and losers in terms of the amount of aid received in relation to country income.  
 Figure 2 instead shows the optimal amount of aid each country should get according to the 
allocation rule, again in relation to their GNI (PPP) per capita. Comparing the two graphs again 
highlights the existence of winners and losers. Figure 3 makes the comparison more explicit, 
showing both the actual aid received and the optimal aid a country should get according to the 
allocation rule for 14 example countries. We can for instance note that the low level of aid the 
DRC receives in relation to their national income actually corresponds with their specified 
optimal level of aid, due to their low policy scores and thus low assumed aid/GDP saturation 
point.  Others stand out as clear aid orphans. Consider Tanzania. According to the allocation 
rule, they should receive 183 USD/capita, but in practice, they only receive 81. At the other 
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end of the spectrum, among the aid darlings, countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and 
Turkey receive substantial aid volumes, while according to our allocation rule they should 
receive none.  
 Table 1, which shows the actual and optimal aid allocation across orphan and darling 
countries as defined in Section 4, provides an aggregate picture of our results. The optimal aid 
allocation (Column 2) and recommended change (Column 5) are based on our benchmark 
calibration. The upper and lower bounds (Columns 3-4 and 6-7), which will be discussed 
further in the next section, are derived from the sensitivity analysis. The results suggest a 
substantial misallocation of aid. Specifically, the benchmark calibration suggests that donors 
should reallocate 73.5 billion USD from the darling to the orphan countries. Thus, according 
to our poverty minimizing allocation rule, nearly half of the total aid budget of 149.4 billion 
USD is misallocated. These figures are clearly alarming. 
 Our model predicts that the suggested reallocation of aid would come with significant 
gains in terms of poverty reduction. Based on equation (13), we can conclude that the average 
poverty reducing effect of the proposed decrease in aid to the darling countries is only 4.4 
percent of the equivalent effect in the orphan countries. We can think of the foregone poverty 
reduction in the darling countries – 0.044*73.5 = 3.2 billion USD – as the cost of the proposed 
reallocation, which in turn implies that the net benefit of the reallocation would be 73.5-3.2 = 
70.3 billion USD.13  This means that the proposed reallocation of aid could reduce poverty by 
as much as if the total aid volume would increase by 70.3 billion USD (allocated optimally). 
The overall picture from our benchmark calibration, based on a comprehensive dataset 
including a large group of new donors, is thus that today’s aid allocation pattern is very 
inefficient in terms of poverty reduction, and that there are substantial gains to be made by 
reallocating aid from darling to orphan countries.  
 A potential objection is that optimal aid allocation estimations are likely to be sensitive to 
different calibrations, e.g. to using different elasticities of poverty with respect to income, 
different aid/GDP saturation points, and to measuring and incorporating policy and poverty in 




13 In the sensitivity analysis, we find a lower bound of 0.9 percent and an upper bound of 17.6 percent, giving a 
net benefit in the interval 60.6 – 72.8 billion USD. 
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 5.2 Conservative estimates 
 
Based on extensive sensitivity analysis, we divide the aid receiving countries in our sample 
into pure and borderline orphans, and pure and borderline darlings (see Figure 4). For 
conservative estimates, let us consider only the pure orphans/darlings, i.e. the countries that 
receive less/more aid than the allocation rule specifies in all 162 calibrations. Tables 2 and 3 
present the optimal aid allocation to pure orphans and darlings, broken down by country. 
 As seen in Table 2, the pure orphans consist of 11 countries. All our estimations suggest 
that in order to reduce poverty, one should scale up aid to these countries. Today, the total aid 
to the pure orphan countries amounts to 26 billion USD. According to our benchmark 
calibration, however, they should receive approximately 65 billion USD, implying a suggested 
reallocation of nearly 39 billion USD, or 150 percent. In absolute terms, the most seriously 
underfunded countries in relation to their recommended optimal aid level are (in order) 
Bangladesh, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia. In Bangladesh, the recommended aid 
level is more than four times the size of the amount received. In Tanzania, the recommended 
aid level is more than twice that received. Roughly speaking, the same goes for most countries 
in the group. Hence, in relative terms, the recommended increases are overall substantial. The 
highest recommended aid-percent is 33.8 percent of GDP to Burkina Faso. Looking at the 
upper and lower bounds for optimal aid, we see that the confidence intervals are quite wide. 
However, at the very least, i.e. considering only the lower bound estimates, the estimations 
suggest an increase of 14 billion USD going to the pure orphans. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, 91 of our 152 sample countries receive more aid than the 
allocation rule specifies in all 162 calibrations and are thus classified as pure darlings (see 
Table 3). Today, total aid to this group of countries amounts to 60.4 billion USD. According 
to our benchmark poverty efficient allocation, however, they should receive only 6.9 billion, 
i.e. less than 12 percent of the actual amount obtained. Indeed, considering the upper and lower 
bounds for the optimal aid estimates (Columns 9-10), we can note that for most countries in 
this group, the recommendation is zero aid in all calibrations. We find the largest recommended 
decrease, in absolute terms, in Egypt (6.1 billion USD). Another notable case is Turkey, which 
in spite of being an upper middle-income country, receives 4.6 billion USD in aid, rather than 
as recommended in all calibrations of the poverty efficient allocation: zero. 
 The pattern illustrates the multiple objectives of donors. The US, for instance, views Egypt 
as an important ally in the region, helping to counteract military threats from other Arab states 
against Israel (Al Jazeera, 2017). Egypt’s domestic stability, both economic and military, is 
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thus in the interest of the US. A similar story applies to Turkey, with its strategic position 
connecting Eastern Europe and West Asia, and bordering several Middle Eastern countries 
involved in military conflict in the region. Furthermore, some large aid flows, such as those to 
Haiti after the massive 2010 earthquake, are motivated by humanitarian emergencies. For 
others, consider e.g. the aid to war-torn Afghanistan, there are likely both strategic and 
humanitarian motives involved.  
 While the allocation of aid among countries clearly reflects multiple objectives, the 
relatively large aid flows to many middle income countries in this group go against the official 
donor emphasis on poverty reduction. If we again take a cautious approach, and consider only 
the lower bound estimates, the estimations suggest decreasing the amount of aid going to this 
group of countries by 46.7 billion USD. According to our lower bound estimate, 31 percent of 
the total aid budget is thus misallocated. 
 For the sake of brevity, we present the results for the optimal aid allocation to borderline 
orphans and darlings, broken down by country, in the appendix (Tables A6-A7). We have 25 
borderline orphans in our sample. As noted, these countries receive less aid than the allocation 
rule specifies in the benchmark calibration, but more aid than our allocation rule specifies in at 
least one robustness calibration. Considering that we run 162 different calibrations, this is 
indeed a tough test. The reasons why these countries turn out borderline cases differ.  
 For some, it is a question of a weak policy environment. Despite widespread poverty and 
aid levels that under normal circumstances (average policy scores) would be far below the 
saturation point, calibrations giving high weight to policy scores still suggest reducing aid to 
these countries (consider e.g. Chad, Eritrea, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Togo, and 
Madagascar). This group of countries arguably highlights the need to find aid modalities that 
can help reduce poverty in unstable policy environments (e.g. support through NGOs), or for 
that matter, the importance of strengthening governance.  
 For other countries with very low incomes (e.g. Gambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, 
Rwanda, and Sierra Leone), it is rather a question of being close to the lowest saturation point 
used in our alternative calibrations. If we choose to trust the most conservative calibrations, 
one could argue that these countries highlight the importance of increasing the aid absorptive 
capacity of the poorest countries. Notably, while these countries do not receive very large 
volumes of aid in per capita terms, their low levels of GDP still imply comparatively high 
shares of aid in GDP. 
 Finally, a number of countries are simply borderline cases in terms of poverty. In some 
countries, the different poverty measures point in different directions (e.g. Nigeria and Nepal), 
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in other cases, all measures suggest borderline poverty levels (notable Vietnam, Ghana, 
Nicaragua, and Mauritania). 
 
 5.3 Donor comparisons 
 
The donors included in the analysis, ranging from small bilateral actors to large multilaterals 
organizations and other global players, are by no means homogenous. Indeed, a common 
argument is that bilateral aid is often tied to the political agenda of the donor country, whereas 
multilateral donors are often seen as more impartial (see the discussion in Charron, 2011). In 
this section, we break down the analysis by donor groups and assess the poverty-reducing 
efficiency of the respective allocations. 
 We calculate the total poverty reduction of aid from each donor, in relation to the volume 
of total aid given by that donor, giving a measure of average poverty reduction per aid dollar. 
We standardize the average poverty reducing efficiency to 100, implying that a country with 
an estimated poverty reducing efficiency of, say, 120 is 20 percent more effective at reducing 
poverty than aid on average (see equation (17)). Table 4 presents the results, by donor groups. 
 The poverty-reducing efficiency in column 2 varies considerably across the specified 
groups. In line with the above argument, suggesting that bilateral aid is to a greater extent 
motivated by strategic political considerations, both the DAC and, particularly, the non-DAC 
bilateral donors perform worse than average in terms of poverty-reducing efficiency. The 
multilaterals – with the World Bank and the UN at the forefront – as well as the new global 
actors and the NGOs, are more efficient than average. The exception is aid from the EC, which 
is significantly below average in terms of poverty-reducing efficiency, possibly reflecting an 
influence of strategic rather than poverty focused considerations of EC member countries.  
 There is also considerable variation across donors within groups. In the interest of space, 
we present the detailed tables, broken down by individual donors, in the appendix (see Table 
A8). However, we can note some interesting patterns. Among the bilateral DAC-donors the 
variation is huge. Considering the G7 countries, the allocations of the UK and Canada perform 
clearly above average, whereas those of Japan, France and Germany perform clearly below 
(the US and Italy are close to average). Comparing the allocations of the UK and France is 
particularly striking; the estimations suggest that an aid dollar from the UK is 190 percent more 
efficient in terms of reducing poverty than an aid dollar from France. The allocations of 
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Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands and the Nordic countries are all well above 
average.14 
 China stands for a third of all non-DAC bilateral aid. In terms of the poverty-reducing 
efficiency of their allocation, they actually perform clearly above average, probably reflecting 
their relative focus on African countries. Hence, in line with the findings of Dreher et al. (2018), 
which suggest that Chinas motives are not substantially different from those shaping the 
allocation of Western aid, these estimates provide no support for worries that China is less 
poverty oriented than the traditional bilateral DAC donors. The poverty-reducing efficiency of 
aid flows from the central European nations Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Poland 
and the Czech Republic (small donors that have become DAC members after the time span 
considered in this study), are all considerably below average. Finally, Brazil and South Africa 
(both small donors in terms of volumes) are much more efficient than average, whereas Saudi 
Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey (together capturing 59 percent of all bilateral non-
DAC aid) are much less efficient than average.  
 Taking into account the sensitivity of estimates does not change this picture very much. 
The upper and lower bounds of the individual donor estimates tell us that the magnitudes should 
be interpreted as roughly +/- 20 percent in general. For example, while the benchmark estimate 
suggests that Canada’s poverty-reducing efficiency is 66 percent above average, the lower and 
upper bounds are 40 and 90 percent respectively. However, since most donors’ scores move in 
the same direction between different calibrations, the relative efficiency across donors is more 
stable than these intervals would seem to suggest.  
 In the next section, we have a closer look at the role of the ‘new donors’ and the new 
financial flows (NFFs).  
 
 5.4 Focusing on the new donors and new financial flows 
 
Next, we are interested in whether the new actors and sources of development finance on the 
development arena help counteract the relative neglect of some countries in the distribution of 
aid. In relative terms, do these new flows help alleviate, or add to, the observed misallocation 
of aid? In absolute terms, are the flows to aid orphans large enough to compensate for the lack 
of aid? 
 
14 The variation between different NGOs is similarly large. For example, MSF and Welt Hunger Hilfe score about 




 With respect to the ‘New Donors’, we have seen that the non-DAC bilateral donors 
perform clearly below and the new global actors well above average in terms of poverty 
reduction per aid dollar. While evidently no homogenous group, together the new donors 
perform below average in terms of relative poverty reducing efficiency. To get a picture of to 
what extent they contribute to poverty reduction, however, we also need to consider aid 
volumes. Column 5 in Table 4 gives the proportion of total poverty reduction – defined as 
poverty reduction efficiency per aid dollar multiplied by the total aid volume – achieved by 
each donor or donor group.  
 We can note that even though the estimated poverty reduction per aid dollar among the 
bilateral non-DAC donors is only 63.5 percent of the average poverty reducing efficiency, they 
stand for a rather significant share (9.1 percent) of overall poverty reduction.15 On the other 
hand, even though the poverty reducing efficiency per aid dollar among the New Global Actors 
is 44.1 percent higher than average, they stand for a quite modest share (around 5.5 percent) of 
overall poverty reduction. The reason, of course, lies in the relatively large aid volumes from 
the non-DAC donors and the relatively modest aid flows from the New Global Actors. Taken 
together, the new donors contribute to an estimated 14.6 percent of overall poverty reduction. 
While not a total game changer, this it is clearly not negligible. 
 Knowing that the part played by traditional official development assistance (ODA) in 
development cooperation is becoming less dominant (OECD, 2014), we next turn to the role 
of other international flows. We consider three kinds of new financial flows (NFFs): OOF, FDI 
and Personal Remittances. Including both state flows, commercial flows, and transfers within 
families, NFF is clearly a very heterogeneous category including flows that presumably take 
place for widely different reasons. As such, NFFs are not directly comparable to aid, and we 
thus cannot apply the same analytical framework as that used to assess the poverty reducing 
efficiency of aid. For instance, we have no reason to assume the same saturation points, or 
poverty elasticities with respect to income, for these flows as for aid. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to explore whether NFFs help counteract the observed misallocation of aid. 
 Hence, we compare the distributional profiles of the NFFs to those observed for aid. 
Column 6 in Table 4 gives the average poverty in the NFF-receiving (and for comparison, aid-
receiving) countries, weighed by financial flow volume.16 Among the NFF-receiving countries, 
 
15 For equivalent figures on individual donor countries, see Table A8. 
16 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑤𝑤𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝 = ∑ (𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖×𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖
∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
 where 𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖  refers to the 
respective flows of 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  and 𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  going to country i (and correspondingly, for comparison, the 
respective aid flows). 
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average poverty is in the range of 10-14 percent (lowest for FDI and OOF, highest for 
remittances). Considering the corresponding figures for aid-receiving countries, which range 
between 15 (“Other multilateral donors”) and 35 (the World Bank and New Global Actors) 
percent, it is clear that NFFs have a significantly lower poverty focus than aid.  
 Another way to assess the distributional profiles of the new donors and new financial 
flows, is by considering to what extent they go to the most underfunded countries. Table 5 
presents the allocation of aid and other flows across orphan and darling countries, in absolute 
value (USD per capita) as well as a share of the total flow type.17 For the sake of brevity, we 
focus primarily on the most under-funded group, i.e. the pure orphans. However, the 
corresponding figures for the other recipient country groups – borderline orphans, borderline 
darlings and pure darlings – are included for comparison. As a point of reference, we can note 
that out of all aid from Traditional donors, about 19 percent goes to pure orphan countries. In 
terms of volumes, this amounts to around 49 USD per capita.  
 Among the new donors, in comparison, only 8 percent of the bilateral non-DAC aid goes 
to the pure orphan countries. In line with our previous discussion, the New Global Actors 
perform significantly better in relative terms, with 24 percent of their aid going to the most 
underfunded group. In dollar terms, both the contribution of the non-DAC bilateral donors (4 
USD per capita) and that of the New Global Actors (3 USD per capita) are relatively minor, 
however.  
 Turning to the new financial flows, we can note that the volume of OOF going to the pure 
orphan countries is relatively modest. On average, the pure orphans receive about 9 USD per 
capita in OOF. In USD per capita terms, all aid flows tend to be larger (although, per definition, 
not large enough according to our allocation rule) among orphan countries than among darling 
countries, reflecting that the former group of countries tend to be significantly poorer than the 
latter. Notably, however, this is not true for OOF, which in per capita terms is lowest in the 
pure orphan group. Indeed, it is more than 50 percent higher in the borderline orphan group, 
and twice the size in the two darling groups.  
 
17 Note that these figures are somewhat difficult to interpret on their own. In general, comparing the allocations 
of different flow types to a specific group of recipient countries is more informative than comparing the allocation 
of a specific flow type across groups. For instance, comparing the share of aid vs. the share of OOF going to the 
most underfunded group (pure orphans), gives a picture of their respective poverty focus. Comparing the shares 
of a specific flow type, say OOF, going to the orphan and darling groups is, on the other, not very informative, 
since the orphan and darling groups contain different numbers of countries, with different size populations. 
Similarly, comparing the USD per capita measures of a specific flow type across the orphan and darling groups 
is of limited relevance, seeing that the table provides no information about recipient country poverty levels. Again, 
however, comparing the USD per capita contributions of different flow types to the most underfunded group helps 
to shed light on to what extent they help alleviate or add to the observed misallocation of funds.  
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 For FDI, this pattern is even more striking; the average FDI per capita in the pure orphan 
group (17 USD) is only 9 percent of that in the pure darling group (195 USD). Furthermore, 
the volumes are again relatively modest; considering FDI and OOF together, they amount to 
less than half of what the most underfunded countries receive in aid per capita. Considering 
that poverty reduction is no objective of these flows, this is not necessarily surprising. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to argue that OOF and FDI substitutes for aid in this vulnerable 
group. On the contrary, rather than counteracting the relative neglect of the pure orphans in the 
allocation of aid, these flows add to the inequitable distribution. 
 Do personal remittances help make up for the allocation problem at hand? Seemingly no. 
On the one hand, compared to the limited amounts of OOF and FDI to the pure orphan group, 
these flows are larger in per capita terms. Again, however, the flow type is smallest in the most 
underfunded group. Furthermore, even if the aggregate picture had been more equitable, 
personal remittances are unlikely to reach the poorest segments of the population within 
countries. Once again, then, these flows cannot be said to substitute for aid in the most 
underfunded countries. 
 Considering the flow shares going to the pure orphan countries confirms the picture that 
the NFFs have a comparatively weak poverty focus. Compared to the 17.4 percent of total aid 
going to the pure orphan countries, the shares of the respective NFFs that go to the same group 
of countries range from 1.3 percent (FDI) to 6.8 percent (remittances). While hardly surprising 
(ODA should, by definition, have development intent and thus be more poverty focused), this 
goes to show that NFFs cannot be said to substitute for aid in the most underfunded countries. 
 In sum, neither the new donors nor the new financial flows alleviate the observed 
misallocation of aid. While the new donors stand for a non-negligible share of overall poverty 
reduction, they perform below average in terms of poverty reduction per aid dollar, and their 
share in total aid is smaller in the orphan than in the darling countries. Similarly, rather than 
counteracting the relative neglect of the pure orphans in the allocation of aid, the NFFs 
considered here add to the inequitable distribution. Furthermore, the size of these alternative 
flows are not significant enough to substitute for the lack of aid to this group.  
 
 6 Conclusions 
 
While poverty reduction takes center stage among official donor objectives, the poorest 
countries are not necessarily the ones receiving most aid. In this study, we explored whether 
the changing aid landscape, where new actors and sources of development finance are 
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becoming increasingly influential, has helped achieve a more poverty efficient allocation of 
aid. Specifically, we derived a poverty-minimizing allocation of aid, based on which we 
assessed the poverty-efficiency of actual aid allocations, with a special focus on the 
comparative impact of new donors and new non-aid flows.  
 Our poverty-minimizing aid allocation rule has a number of key features. In line with the 
pioneering work of Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002), it is specified so that holding the level of 
poverty constant, aid should increase with the quality of policy, and holding the quality of 
policy constant, it should increase with poverty. However, rather than deriving an allocation 
rule that maximizes poverty reduction via growth, which can be questioned on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds, we allow aid to have a direct effect on income. As is standard in the 
literature, we assume aid to have diminishing returns. Furthermore, we assume that the 
saturation point for consumption-aid is the same as that for growth-aid. To take account of 
structural economic vulnerability and low human capital, finally, we use an augmented policy 
rating rather than the standard CPR. To assess the sensitivity to using different model 
specifications and measures, we perform a battery of robustness checks.  
 Considering aggregate flows, our baseline results suggest a substantial misallocation of 
aid. Specifically, the benchmark calibration suggests that donors should reallocate 73.5 billion 
USD, i.e. nearly half the total aid budget, from countries receiving more aid than our allocation 
rule specifies – referred to as aid darlings – to countries receiving less aid than our allocation 
rule specifies – referred to as aid orphans. Our estimates suggest that this reallocation of aid 
could reduce poverty by as much as if the total aid volume would increase by 70.3 billion USD 
(allocated optimally). The overall picture from our benchmark calibration, based on a 
comprehensive dataset including a large group of new donors, is thus that today’s aid allocation 
pattern is very inefficient in terms of poverty reduction, and that there are substantial gains to 
be made by reallocating aid from darling to orphan countries. 
 Acknowledging that optimal aid allocation estimations are likely to be sensitive to 
different calibrations, we carefully evaluate the sensitivity of these estimates. Using different 
elasticities of poverty with respect to income, different aid/GDP saturation points, and 
measuring and incorporating policy and poverty in different ways, we end up with 162 
calibrations in total. Based on these, we establish upper and lower bounds on our estimates. 
Specifically, we divide the aid receiving countries in our sample into pure orphans and darlings, 
and borderline orphans and darlings, where the former receive less/more aid than the allocation 
rule specifies in all 162 calibrations whereas the latter change status in some robustness 
calibration. For conservative estimates, we consider only the pure orphans/darlings. 
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 In our sample of 152 aid-receiving countries, we identify 11 pure orphans and 91 pure 
darlings. All our estimations suggest that in order to reduce poverty, one should reallocate aid 
from the latter to the former. Notable pure orphan countries are Bangladesh, Tanzania, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and Zambia. In Bangladesh, the recommended aid level is more than four 
times the size of the amount received. While the allocation of aid among countries clearly 
reflects multiple objectives, the relatively large aid flows to many middle income countries in 
the pure darling group go against the official donor emphasis on poverty reduction. If we take 
a cautious approach, and consider only the lower bound estimates, the results suggest 
decreasing the amount of aid going to this group of countries by 46.7 billion USD. According 
to our lower bound estimate, 31 percent of the total aid budget is thus misallocated. 
 The estimated poverty-reducing efficiency, or the average poverty reduction per aid dollar, 
varies considerably across donor groups. Whereas the multilaterals – with the World Bank and 
the UN at the forefront – as well as the new global actors and the NGOs, are more efficient 
than average, the bilaterals, both DAC and (even more so) non-DAC, as a group perform worse. 
However, there is equally important variation across donors within groups, with e.g. the World 
Bank performing significantly better in terms of poverty reducing efficiency than the EC 
among the multilaterals, and e.g. the UK and Canada performing better than France and 
Germany among the major bilaterals.  
 Turning to the new donors and the new financial flows, we should note that both constitute 
very heterogeneous categories. Regarding the new donors, the new global actors perform well 
above average and the non-DAC bilateral donors clearly below in terms of poverty reducing 
efficiency. The NFFs similarly include very diverse flows and actors, guided by very different 
motivations. Indeed, the NFFs are by no means directly comparable to aid. Nonetheless, we 
are interested in whether these flows help counteract the observed misallocation of aid. 
 Overall, neither the new donors nor the new financial flows alleviate the observed 
misallocation of aid. While it is worth noting that new donors stand for a non-negligible share 
of overall poverty reduction, together they perform below average in terms of poverty reduction 
per aid dollar. Similarly, rather than counteracting the relative neglect of the pure orphans in 
the allocation of aid, the New Financial Flows add to the inequitable distribution. For the 
countries that we identify as aid orphans, these flows are simply not significant enough to 
substitute for the lack of aid. 
 Our findings thus suggest that the traditional donor community cannot rely on the new 
donors and non-aid flows to compensate for the relative neglect of the most underfunded 
countries in the distribution of aid. To live up to official donor objectives to ‘end poverty in all 
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its forms everywhere’ donors should, well, not kill their darlings, but at least reallocate a 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1: Aid per capita (USD) vs. GNI (PPP) per capita (USD). Average 2009-2013.  
 
Notes: The sample excludes countries with GNI (PPP)/capita over 10,000 USD and countries with a population of less than 
5 million 
 
Figure 2: Optimal aid per capita (USD) vs. GNI (PPP) per capita USD) 
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Figure 4: Orphans and darlings 
 
Notes: ‘Pure orphans’ refer to countries that are orphans, i.e. receive less aid than our 
allocation rule specifies, in all calibrations. ‘Borderline orphans’ are countries that are 
orphans in the benchmark calibration, but darlings in some robustness calibration/s. ‘Pure 
darlings’ are countries that are darlings (i.e. receive more aid than our allocation rule 
specifies) in all calibrations. ‘Borderline darlings’ are countries that are darlings in the 
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Table 1: Aggregate results, all donors 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 














Orphans        
Pure 25985 64595 40017 88124 38610 14032 62139 
Borderline 38179 73107 9547 151442 34928 -28632 113263 
Total 64164 137702   73538   
Darlings        
Pure 60385 6924 314 13675 -53461 -60071 -46710 
Borderline 24840 4763 221 84785 -20077 -24619 59945 
Total 85225 11687   -73538   
Grand Total 149389 149389   0   
Notes: ‘Pure orphans’ refer to countries that are classified as orphans, i.e. countries that receive less aid than our allocation 
rule specifies, in all calibrations. ‘Borderline orphans’ are countries that are orphans in the benchmark calibration, but 
darlings in some robustness calibration/s. ‘Pure darlings’ are countries that are darlings in all calibrations. ‘Borderline 
darlings’ are countries that are darlings in the benchmark calibration, but orphans in some calibration/s. The figures in 





Table 2: Actual and optimal aid to pure orphans 







































Bangladesh 153 819 27 3.3 4141 110 13.5 16938 9707 24451 12798 5567 20311 
Tanzania 47 770 81 10.5 3823 183 23.7 8616 5945 10981 4793 2122 7158 
Ethiopia 90 410 54 13.2 4879 106 26.0 9573 6219 11973 4694 1340 7094 
Kenya 41 1079 105 9.7 4348 193 17.9 8016 5465 11677 3668 1117 7329 
Zambia 14 1558 96 6.2 1384 315 20.2 4517 2005 7008 3132 620 5623 
Uganda 34 618 62 10.1 2140 141 22.8 4826 3360 5851 2687 1220 3712 
Burkina Faso 16 635 80 12.6 1294 215 33.8 3460 1922 4939 2167 629 3646 
Senegal 13 1034 100 9.6 1335 259 25.0 3460 2061 4648 2125 727 3313 
Mali 16 759 110 14.5 1722 187 24.7 2932 1806 3745 1210 84 2023 
Benin 10 798 70 8.8 687 187 23.4 1826 1207 2270 1139 520 1583 
Lesotho 2 1083 115 10.6 234 211 19.5 430 320 581 197 86 347 





Table 3: Actual and optimal aid to pure darlings 




































Egypt 84 2865 73 2.6 6142 0 0.0 0 0 0 6142 6142 6142 
Afghanistan 29 599 250 41.7 7206 78 13.0 2241 0 3531 4965 3675 7206 
Turkey 74 10123 62 0.6 4560 0 0.0 0 0 0 4560 4560 4560 
Jordan 7 4240 537 12.7 3624 0 0.0 0 0 0 3624 3624 3624 
Palestine 4 2549 619 24.3 2432 15 0.6 60 0 748 2371 1683 2432 
Iraq 32 5495 67 1.2 2138 0 0.0 0 0 0 2138 2138 2138 
China 1344 5429 1 0.0 1857 0 0.0 0 0 0 1857 1857 1857 
Tunisia 11 4212 171 4.1 1829 0 0.0 0 0 0 1829 1829 1829 
Sri Lanka 20 3022 90 3.0 1815 0 0.0 0 0 0 1815 1815 1815 
Serbia 7 5934 228 3.8 1648 0 0.0 0 0 0 1648 1648 1648 
Brazil 200 11373 7 0.1 1452 0 0.0 0 0 0 1452 1452 1452 
Colombia 46 6909 26 0.4 1219 0 0.0 0 0 0 1219 1219 1219 
Ukraine 46 3386 27 0.8 1215 0 0.0 0 0 0 1215 1215 1215 
Haiti 10 730 209 28.6 2120 98 13.5 998 157 1545 1122 575 1963 
Bolivia 10 2346 107 4.6 1083 0 0.0 0 0 1073 1083 10 1083 
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Mexico 120 9234 7 0.1 889 0 0.0 0 0 0 889 889 889 
Bosnia-H 4 4633 228 4.9 873 0 0.0 0 0 0 873 873 873 
Peru 30 5593 27 0.5 801 0 0.0 0 0 0 801 801 801 
Lebanon 5 8612 157 1.8 732 0 0.0 0 0 0 732 732 732 
Kosovo 2 3544 364 10.3 652 0 0.0 0 0 403 652 249 652 
Somalia 10 521 108 20.8 1062 42 8.1 415 0 924 647 138 1062 
Guatemala 15 3060 38 1.2 574 0 0.0 0 0 0 574 574 574 
Angola 22 4545 25 0.6 558 0 0.0 0 0 475 558 83 558 
Thailand 67 5405 8 0.1 540 0 0.0 0 0 0 540 540 540 
Macedonia 2 4827 257 5.3 531 0 0.0 0 0 0 531 531 531 
Liberia 4 375 209 55.6 848 82 22.0 335 142 425 513 424 706 
Yemen 24 1306 122 9.4 2962 101 7.8 2456 0 2958 506 4 2962 
Mongolia 3 3384 162 4.8 447 0 0.0 0 0 202 447 245 447 
Algeria 37 4974 10 0.2 383 0 0.0 0 0 0 383 383 383 
Albania 3 4261 124 2.9 361 0 0.0 0 0 0 361 361 361 
Dominican-R 10 5623 35 0.6 348 0 0.0 0 0 0 348 348 348 
Mauritius 1 8487 274 3.2 343 0 0.0 0 0 0 343 343 343 
Congo-Brazz 4 3046 81 2.7 339 0 0.0 0 0 300 339 39 339 
Cabo Verde 0 3560 677 19.0 336 0 0.0 0 0 253 336 83 336 
Ecuador 15 5178 22 0.4 331 0 0.0 0 0 0 331 331 331 
Azerbaijan 9 6638 34 0.5 312 0 0.0 0 0 0 312 312 312 
Timor-Leste 1 983 305 31.0 339 32 3.3 36 0 172 304 167 339 
Jamaica 3 5085 89 1.8 242 0 0.0 0 0 0 242 242 242 
Mayotte 0 41911 995 2.4 229 0 0.0 0 0 0 229 229 229 
Guyana 1 3359 303 9.0 229 0 0.0 0 0 0 229 229 229 
Libya 6 10218 36 0.4 226 0 0.0 0 0 0 226 226 226 
Kazakhstan 17 11101 13 0.1 220 0 0.0 0 0 0 220 220 220 
Solomon-I 1 1569 577 36.8 310 171 10.9 92 0 155 218 156 310 
Paraguay 6 3629 33 0.9 209 0 0.0 0 0 0 209 209 209 
Fiji 1 4138 237 5.7 206 0 0.0 0 0 0 206 206 206 
Montenegro 1 6895 292 4.2 181 0 0.0 0 0 0 181 181 181 
Belarus 9 6349 18 0.3 170 0 0.0 0 0 0 170 170 170 
Costa Rica 5 8738 37 0.4 170 0 0.0 0 0 0 170 170 170 
Argentina 42 12570 4 0.0 162 0 0.0 0 0 0 162 162 162 
Chile 17 13721 9 0.1 160 0 0.0 0 0 0 160 160 160 
Cuba 11 6103 13 0.2 149 0 0.0 0 0 0 149 149 149 
Djibouti 1 1476 361 24.5 304 188 12.7 158 0 179 146 125 304 
Gabon 2 10029 89 0.9 141 0 0.0 0 0 0 141 141 141 
Micronesia 0 2940 1334 45.4 138 0 0.0 0 0 7 138 131 138 
39 
 
Wallis-F 0 41911 11174 26.7 128 0 0.0 0 0 0 128 128 128 
Samoa 0 3841 691 18.0 130 27 0.7 5 0 122 125 8 130 
Iran 75 6791 2 0.0 120 0 0.0 0 0 0 120 120 120 
Malaysia 29 9723 4 0.0 102 0 0.0 0 0 0 102 102 102 
Equatorial-G 1 19923 133 0.7 100 0 0.0 0 0 0 100 100 100 
Marshall-I 0 3285 1739 52.9 91 0 0.0 0 0 0 91 91 91 
Tonga 0 3875 825 21.3 86 0 0.0 0 0 33 86 53 86 
Vanuatu 0 3042 668 22.0 162 314 10.3 76 0 106 86 56 162 
Suriname 1 8696 145 1.7 76 0 0.0 0 0 0 76 76 76 
Panama 4 9451 20 0.2 75 0 0.0 0 0 0 75 75 75 
Maldives 0 6498 191 2.9 72 0 0.0 0 0 0 72 72 72 
St. Helena 0 40014 12986 32.5 65 0 0.0 0 0 0 65 65 65 
Uruguay 3 13499 18 0.1 60 0 0.0 0 0 0 60 60 60 
Montserrat 0 40014 10399 26.0 52 0 0.0 0 0 0 52 52 52 
Dominica 0 6931 705 10.2 50 0 0.0 0 0 0 50 50 50 
Seychelles 0 12248 560 4.6 50 0 0.0 0 0 0 50 50 50 
Belize 0 4503 149 3.3 49 0 0.0 0 0 0 49 49 49 
Venezuela 29 12181 2 0.0 48 0 0.0 0 0 0 48 48 48 
Turkmenistan 5 5708 9 0.2 47 0 0.0 0 0 0 47 47 47 
Kiribati 0 1515 666 44.0 70 229 15.1 24 0 28 46 42 70 
Sao Tome-P 0 1366 404 29.6 71 154 11.3 27 15 36 44 35 56 
Palau 0 9819 1767 18.0 36 0 0.0 0 0 0 36 36 36 
Tuvalu 0 3584 3514 98.1 35 0 0.0 0 0 0 35 35 35 
Nauru 0 11332 3235 28.6 33 0 0.0 0 0 0 33 33 33 
St. Lucia 0 7116 164 2.3 29 0 0.0 0 0 0 29 29 29 
Grenada 0 7542 274 3.6 29 0 0.0 0 0 0 29 29 29 
Cook Islands 0 36663 1486 4.1 25 0 0.0 0 0 0 25 25 25 
Croatia 4 13804 6 0.0 24 0 0.0 0 0 0 24 24 24 
St. Kitts-N 0 13763 449 3.3 24 0 0.0 0 0 0 24 24 24 
St. Vincent-G 0 6304 209 3.3 23 0 0.0 0 0 0 23 23 23 
Antigua-B 0 13336 228 1.7 20 0 0.0 0 0 0 20 20 20 
Niue 0 36663 11944 32.6 19 0 0.0 0 0 0 19 19 19 
Tokelau 0 36663 11507 31.4 17 0 0.0 0 0 0 17 17 17 
Anguilla 0 40014 518 1.3 8 0 0.0 0 0 0 8 8 8 
Oman 3 20030 2 0.0 8 0 0.0 0 0 0 8 8 8 
Trinidad-T 1 17435 1 0.0 2 0 0.0 0 0 0 2 2 2 
Barbados 0 15686 4 0.0 1 0 0.0 0 0 0 1 1 1 




Table 4 : Aid volumes and poverty reducing efficiency, by donor groups   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Volume (milj $) 
Poverty reducing 
efficiency per $ Lower bound Upper bound 
Proportion of 
poverty reduction (%) 
Average poverty 
in recipient countries 
All Donors Total 149389 100 100 100 100,0 23.8 
       
Old aid (total) 122279 104,3 102,9 105,6 85,4 24.7 
Bilateral DAC donors 68090 90,5 89,4 94,9 41,2 24.0 
EC 19007 66,9 58,1 69,7 8,5 15.7 
UN 2905 139,7 113 161 2,7 30.1 
WB 14255 194,1 177,7 203,2 18,5 35.3 
IMF 1325 111,2 92,1 173,8 1,0 33.8 
Regional development banks 7561 125 115,1 138,7 6,3 27.2 
Other multilateral donors (excl. Vertical Funds) 2243 62,2 56,2 67,5 0,9 14.7 
NGOs 6893 133,4 102,7 157 6,2 31.2 
       
New aid (total) 27110 80,5 74,7 87 14,6 20.0 
Bilateral non-DAC donors 21382 63,5 55 73,8 9,1 15.9 
New global actors 5729 144,1 134,6 162,1 5,5 35.2 
    Vertical funds 5033 140,7 125,6 155 4,7 34.7 
    Bill and Melinda Gates Fund 696 168,9 134,5 223,7 0,8 38.9 
       
New Financial flows       
OOF 82860     10.2 
Personal remittances 264463     14.0 
FDI 580858     10.2 
Notes: All volumes in the first column, except the new financial flows, refer to ODA; The average poverty reducing efficiency for all donors is set to 100; The upper and lower bounds are derived from the sensitivity 
analysis; Column 5 gives the proportion of total poverty reduction – defined as poverty reduction efficiency per aid dollar multiplied by the total aid volume – achieved by each donor or donor group. Column 6 gives 




Table 5: Allocation across orphan and darling countries, in per capita terms as well as the percentage share of the financial flow going to the group in question 
 
 





(Bi- & Multilateral) NGOs 
Bilateral 
Non-DAC New actors OOF FDI 
Personal 
remittances 
Pure orphans USD per capita 59,4 49,3 2,9 4,0 3,1 9,2 16,8 41,3 
 
Share (%) 17,4 18,8 18,7 8,2 23,6 4,9 1,3 6,8 
Borderline orphans USD per capita 47,8 38,5 2,1 4,1 3,1 15,0 40,0 64,4 
 
Share (%) 25,6 26,8 24,4 15,4 42,6 14,4 5,5 19,4 
Borderline darlings USD per capita 39,4 29,1 2,3 6,4 1,5 21,6 59,0 95,6 
 
Share (%) 16,6 16,0 21,2 18,9 16,9 16,4 6,4 22,8 
Pure darlings USD per capita 23,3 17,2 0,9 4,7 0,4 20,5 194,6 52,0 
 Share (%) 40,5 38,9 35,7 57,5 16,9 64,3 86,8 50,9 
Total 
USD per capita 33,5 25,9 1,5 4,8 1,3 18,6 130,3 59,3 
 





Appendix A: Tables referred to in the text 
Table A1: Variable descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Old aid   
DAC bilateral aid ODA from Bilateral DAC donors, yearly average 2009-2013 in USD. AidData (2017a) 
Multilateral aid ODA from EC, UN, WB, IMF, Regional Banks, and other multilateral 
donors (except Vertical funds), yearly average 2009-2013 in USD. 
AidData (2017a) 
Aid from NGOs   
NGO data from Koch et al. Aid from NGOs in 2005 Koch et al. (2009) 
NGO data from MSF & ICRS Aid from Doctors without borders (MSF) the International Red Cross 
(ICRC).  
Yearly averages 2009-2013 in USD. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2010, 
2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
International Committee of the 
Red Cross (2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014). 
New aid   
Non-DAC bilateral aid ODA from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Estonia, India, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
United Arab Emirates. We also include Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia since they were not 
DAC-members most of the period 2009-13. 
‘Tracking Under-reported Financial Flows (TUFF) data on ’ODA-like’ 
flows from China, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.  
Yearly average 2009-2013 in USD. 
AidData (2014a, 2014b, 2017a, 
2017b) 
 ODA from Bulgaria, Croatia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkey 
Yearly average 2009-2013 in USD. 
OECD-DAC (2020) 
 
New global actors Aid from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), and the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF). 
Yearly average 2009-2013 in USD. 
AidData (2017a) 
Non-aid flows   
Other Official Flows, OOF Transactions by the official sector which do not meet (all) the 
conditions for eligibility as ODA (being concessional, having a grant 
element of at least 25 percent, and a development objective),  
We use 2013 in USD, since data is missing for the other years. 
We use Commitments and Current USD (just as in the aid data from the 
Aiddata 3.1 dataset) 




FDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$). World Bank (2019b) 
Remittances Personal remittances, received (current US$) World Bank (2019b) 
Other variables    
GDP per capita GDP per capita in current USD World Bank (2019b) 
GNI (PPP) per capita GNI per capita (current international $, PPP-adjusted) World Bank (2019b) 
Poverty Poverty index based on GNI/capita (PPP): ℎ𝑖𝑖0 = 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑖𝑖−𝛼𝛼 Where 𝑘𝑘 is a 
constant, 𝛼𝛼 is elasticity of poverty with respect to income, and 𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑖𝑖 is 
GNI/cap (PPP) in country i. 
Headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (PPP), % of population 
Headcount ratio at $3.10 a day (PPP), % of population 
Average 2009-2013 
World Bank (2019b) 






Country performance rating of the International Development 
Association, World Bank. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0.24𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝐶𝐶 + 0.68𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 +
0.08𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, where the country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) 
index is based on indicators focusing on (A) macroeconomic 
management, (B) structural policies, (C) social policies, and (D) public 
sector management and institutions, and PPR is the IDA portfolio 
performance rating. 
We do not do these calculations by hand. CPR is already available, as its 





Performance Rating (ACPR) 
 
Augmented Country Performance Rating is a weighted average of the 
World Bank CPR and the Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) and Human 
Assets Index (HAI) of the UN.  
Weighting as suggested by 
Guillaumont, Guillaumont-
Jenneney and Wagner (2017: 
32). 
Help variables:   
WGI (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators) 
If CPR is missing, we use predicted CPR from WGI World Bank (2019c)  
Economic Vulnerability 
Index (EVI) and Human 
Assets Index (HAI) 
Used to construct ACPR. 
EVI and HAI are from 2012 due to data limitations. 
United Nations (2019a) 
Human Development Index If HAI & EVI is missing, then we predict ACPR from HDI. If also HDI is 
missing, we use ACPR = CPR. 
Average 2010-2013 due to data limitations 
UNDP (2016) 
Life expectancy at birth 
 
Poverty headcount ratio at 
national poverty lines (% of 
population) 
In years. Used to predict poverty when Poverty 1.90 and/or poverty 
3.10 is missing. 
 
Used to predict poverty when Poverty 1.90 and/or poverty 3.10 is 
missing. 
World Bank (2019b) 
CPIA (Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment) 
















Aid / GDP  
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Bangladesh 153 819 18.2 3.1 3.1 27 3.3 4141 4.0 9.9 80.1 
Benin 10 798 36.0 3.4 3.4 70 8.8 687 6.1 17.1 18.3 
Burkina Faso 16 635 49.4 3.7 3.7 80 12.6 1294 7.7 13.1 11.9 
Ethiopia 90 410 68.7 3.3 3.4 54 13.2 4879 20.3 5.3 5.3 
Kenya 41 1079 20.4 3.5 3.3 105 9.7 4348 7.0 4.7 23.0 
Lesotho 2 1083 18.0 3.4 3.3 115 10.6 234 0.0 28.5 277.6 
Mali 16 759 34.7 3.3 3.4 110 14.5 1722 9.3 29.2 43.9 
Senegal 13 1034 27.2 3.6 3.5 100 9.6 1335 10.1 22.8 114.7 
Tanzania 47 770 26.7 3.5 3.4 81 10.5 3823 4.3 33.4 6.6 
Uganda 34 618 42.8 3.4 3.3 62 10.1 2140 8.5 26.7 24.6 





Table A3: Descriptive statistics for borderline orphan countries 

























Cambodia 15 874 21.1 3.0 3.1 93 10.6 1358 53.3 66.1 11.0 
Cameroon 21 1225 20.4 3.0 3.0 63 5.1 1323 11.4 28.5 9.2 
Chad 12 929 34.3 2.4 3.0 63 6.8 781 1.7 33.6 0.1 
DRC 68 350 100.0 2.5 2.9 35 10.1 2400 1.2 -2.4 0.6 
Eritrea 5 467 56.3 2.5 3.0 23 4.9 108 0.0 13.1 0.7 
Gambia 2 524 43.5 3.2 3.4 128 24.4 224 12.1 21.0 71.4 
Ghana 25 1495 14.2 3.7 3.3 74 5.0 1857 13.4 117.7 51.4 
Guinea 11 463 75.9 2.7 2.9 44 9.6 502 6.0 19.6 5.7 
Guinea-Bissau 2 572 54.8 2.6 3.0 62 10.8 103 0.0 11.5 30.6 
Laos 6 1309 10.6 3.2 3.1 97 7.4 620 316.5 50.9 9.7 
Madagascar 22 439 53.9 3.0 3.0 32 7.2 688 0.1 38.9 19.4 
Malawi 15 431 80.3 3.3 3.4 101 23.4 1538 3.0 24.4 1.7 
Mauritania 4 1300 13.9 3.1 3.2 175 13.4 643 19.7 175.2 20.9 
Mozambique 25 515 93.1 3.5 3.6 114 22.2 2856 1.7 145.3 5.5 
Myanmar 52 1264 17.2 2.8 2.9 38 3.0 2005 0.8 31.0 8.5 
Nepal 27 631 28.7 3.1 3.0 61 9.7 1669 0.5 2.8 154.8 
Nicaragua 6 1657 10.2 3.4 3.1 131 7.9 762 25.1 118.6 158.6 
Niger 17 377 100.0 3.3 3.4 80 21.2 1358 2.8 47.9 8.2 
Nigeria 164 2328 7.9 3.1 3.1 21 0.9 3405 6.7 44.0 122.1 
Pakistan 174 1165 8.8 3.1 3.0 27 2.3 4724 25.0 9.1 68.3 
PNG 7 1746 25.8 3.0 3.0 109 6.2 763 12.3 2.6 1.5 
Rwanda 11 607 52.5 3.7 3.7 124 20.4 1311 2.0 13.0 12.9 
Sierra Leone 6 568 46.0 3.2 3.4 103 18.2 612 12.7 82.9 9.2 
Tajikistan 8 854 25.8 3.1 2.9 68 8.0 529 9.0 5.5 385.6 
Togo 7 548 76.1 2.8 2.9 50 9.0 325 6.5 37.0 50.5 






Table A4: Descriptive statistics for borderline darling countries 
            
  






















Armenia 3 3348 4.4 3.9 3.4 158 4.7 469 74.1 189.6 606.3 
Bhutan 1 2262 5.4 3.9 3.7 502 22.2 367 0.0 54.4 14.6 
Botswana 2 6511 1.7 4.1 3.7 80 1.2 168 78.9 338.1 10.7 
Burundi 10 230 100.0 2.9 3.3 67 29.2 657 0.0 0.2 4.2 
CAR 5 436 100.0 2.6 3.0 77 17.7 349 0.0 9.4 0.0 
Comoros 1 767 54.5 2.6 2.9 145 18.9 104 0.0 16.7 145.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 21 1286 20.0 2.8 2.9 85 6.6 1753 15.9 17.4 17.8 
El Salvador 6 3744 4.3 3.8 3.3 51 1.4 309 58.6 35.3 606.7 
Georgia 4 3563 4.5 4.1 3.5 242 6.8 938 100.8 180.9 390.0 
Honduras 8 2232 9.9 3.3 3.0 102 4.6 781 14.5 109.2 365.5 
Indonesia 245 3274 3.4 3.5 3.0 11 0.3 2664 14.9 69.6 29.0 
Kyrgyzstan 6 1067 18.7 3.2 3.0 159 14.9 880 31.0 81.3 298.7 
Moldova 4 1884 9.0 3.6 3.2 165 8.7 587 51.6 71.2 479.7 
Morocco 33 2979 5.0 3.6 3.2 102 3.4 3314 84.2 73.3 204.8 
Namibia 2 5181 3.5 3.8 3.4 185 3.6 416 130.2 175.4 6.1 
North Korea 25 1137 42.2 2.1 2.3 4 0.4 108 0.1 3.7  
Philippines 95 2349 4.3 3.7 3.2 18 0.8 1742 18.8 25.6 245.1 
South Africa 52 7172 2.1 4.0 3.4 30 0.4 1527 16.4 109.8 20.0 
South Sudan 11 1327 25.9 2.1 2.5 113 8.5 1191 5.5 -30.0 0.2 
Sudan 37 1518 14.0 2.3 2.6 71 4.7 2606 15.0 51.6 26.5 
Swaziland 1 3473 4.4 3.3 3.2 100 2.9 121 0.0 68.3 40.8 
Syria 20 1217 16.4 3.0 2.7 88 7.3 1786 0.1 99.9 77.6 
Uzbekistan 29 1540 8.6 3.0 2.9 26 1.7 769 55.9 36.4 148.2 





Table A5: Descriptive statistics for pure darling countries                 





Poverty CPR ACPR 
Aid per capita 
(USD) 












Afghanistan 29 599 35.4 2.6 3.0 250 41.7 7206 0.5 2.8 8.6 
Albania 3 4261 2.8 3.6 3.2 124 2.9 361 135.1 388.9 393.4 
Algeria 37 4974 1.8 3.1 2.8 10 0.2 383 0.0 58.8 5.3 
Angola 22 4545 5.9 2.5 3.0 25 0.6 558 48.4 -164.5 0.2 
Anguilla 0 40014 0.4 4.8 4.8 518 1.3 8 0.0   
Antigua-B 0 13336 1.0 4.1 3.5 228 1.7 20 113.4 1148.4 234.0 
Argentina 42 12570 0.9 3.4 2.9 4 0.0 162 39.3 246.4 14.7 
Azerbaijan 9 6638 1.5 3.3 2.9 34 0.5 312 96.6 406.4 180.5 
Barbados 0 15686 1.5 4.5 3.7 4 0.0 1 1.2 1385.7 408.5 
Belarus 9 6349 1.4 2.9 2.6 18 0.3 170 175.9 231.7 89.4 
Belize 0 4503 4.3 3.4 3.2 149 3.3 49 0.0 356.8 232.4 
Bolivia 10 2346 6.9 3.3 3.1 107 4.6 1083 20.8 93.5 106.6 
Bosnia-H 4 4633 2.9 3.4 3.1 228 4.9 873 99.8 93.1 506.3 
Brazil 200 11373 1.6 3.7 3.1 7 0.1 1452 37.0 375.9 14.7 
Cabo Verde 0 3560 6.1 4.0 3.5 677 19.0 336 206.4 227.3 321.9 
Chile 17 13721 1.1 4.7 3.9 9 0.1 160 42.4 1161.2 6.0 
China 1344 5429 2.6 3.7 3.1 1 0.0 1857 4.9 176.6 11.1 
Colombia 46 6909 2.3 3.8 3.2 26 0.4 1219 36.3 260.2 89.3 
Congo-Brazz 4 3046 9.8 2.7 2.8 81 2.7 339 3.0 452.6 12.9 
Cook Islands 0 36663 0.5 2.9 2.9 1486 4.1 25 352.9   
Costa Rica 5 8738 1.9 4.0 3.4 37 0.4 170 135.9 516.3 118.4 
Croatia 4 13804 1.0 4.1 3.4 6 0.0 24 0.0 390.0 468.4 
Cuba 11 6103 1.1 3.1 2.8 13 0.2 149 0.0   
Djibouti 1 1476 18.2 2.9 3.1 361 24.5 304 148.2 144.5 39.5 
Dominica 0 6931 2.8 3.8 3.3 705 10.2 50 195.9 341.6 321.1 
Dominican-R 10 5623 2.4 3.4 3.0 35 0.6 348 68.6 206.0 404.8 
Ecuador 15 5178 2.8 3.1 2.8 22 0.4 331 143.7 31.8 170.7 
Egypt 84 2865 2.8 3.3 2.9 73 2.6 6142 40.0 46.7 169.2 
Equatorial-G 1 19923 1.0 2.5 2.8 133 0.7 100 154.4 2145.3 0.2 
Fiji 1 4138 4.2 3.1 2.9 237 5.7 206 29.3 309.0 207.6 
Gabon 2 10029 1.5 3.1 3.0 89 0.9 141 65.5 427.3 14.3 
Grenada 0 7542 2.5 3.6 3.2 274 3.6 29 0.0 593.4 274.1 
Guatemala 15 3060 5.0 3.3 3.0 38 1.2 574 13.4 70.4 308.1 
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Guyana 1 3359 5.6 3.1 2.9 303 9.0 229 0.0 287.7 486.7 
Haiti 10 730 42.8 2.7 3.0 209 28.6 2120 1.2 13.2 153.7 
Iran 75 6791 1.2 3.0 2.8 2 0.0 120 4.6 49.5 15.9 
Iraq 32 5495 1.7 2.8 2.9 67 1.2 2138 19.8 85.2 6.8 
Jamaica 3 5085 3.6 3.8 3.3 89 1.8 242 122.2 137.2 767.7 
Jordan 7 4240 2.6 3.8 3.2 537 12.7 3624 50.5 263.9 591.4 
Kazakhstan 17 11101 1.0 3.4 2.9 13 0.1 220 139.5 713.6 11.9 
Kiribati 0 1515 21.0 3.1 3.2 666 44.0 70 5.7 -6.1 150.0 
Kosovo 2 3544 3.5 3.4 3.4 364 10.3 652 27.4 232.1 598.2 
Lebanon 5 8612 1.4 3.5 3.0 157 1.8 732 32.2 790.4 1527.5 
Liberia 4 375 100.0 2.9 3.3 209 55.6 848 4.3 159.3 64.7 
Libya 6 10218 0.8 2.7 2.4 36 0.4 226 9.6 210.9 2.6 
Macedonia 2 4827 2.1 3.7 3.2 257 5.3 531 0.0 175.2 191.1 
Malaysia 29 9723 0.9 4.3 3.6 4 0.0 102 1.1 324.2 43.1 
Maldives 0 6498 2.9 3.4 3.2 191 2.9 72 173.6 736.9 9.1 
Marshall-I 0 3285 9.7 2.8 2.8 1739 52.9 91 0.0 208.7 440.5 
Mauritius 1 8487 1.3 4.4 3.6 274 3.2 343 275.1 319.6 0.5 
Mayotte 0 41911 0.4 4.7 4.7 995 2.4 229 0.0   
Mexico 120 9234 1.4 3.9 3.3 7 0.1 889 21.8 223.2 190.4 
Micronesia 0 2940 12.9 2.8 2.7 1334 45.4 138 46.5 7.7 188.5 
Mongolia 3 3384 3.6 3.4 3.2 162 4.8 447 96.5 987.1 95.7 
Montenegro 1 6895 1.6 3.7 3.1 292 4.2 181 218.9 1267.5 549.5 
Montserrat 0 40014 0.4 4.9 4.9 10399 26.0 52 0.0   
Nauru 0 11332 1.6 3.1 3.1 3235 28.6 33 0.0 27.6 412.0 
Niue 0 36663 0.5 2.9 2.9 11944 32.6 19 0.0   
Oman 3 20030 0.3 4.0 3.4 2 0.0 8 0.0 379.3 11.9 
Palau 0 9819 2.0 3.1 2.8 1767 18.0 36 0.0 518.8 96.6 
Palestine 4 2549 8.2 3.4 3.1 619 24.3 2432 0.0 49.4 308.3 
Panama 4 9451 1.4 3.9 3.3 20 0.2 75 185.6 851.9 107.4 
Paraguay 6 3629 4.7 3.2 3.0 33 0.9 209 57.1 52.7 82.1 
Peru 30 5593 2.8 3.7 3.2 27 0.5 801 20.4 294.0 88.2 
Samoa 0 3841 7.0 4.1 3.6 691 18.0 130 4.5 59.3 810.6 
Sao Tome-P 0 1366 18.0 3.2 3.1 404 29.6 71 0.0 144.8 55.1 
Serbia 7 5934 2.0 3.6 3.1 228 3.8 1648 105.4 355.9 560.6 
Seychelles 0 12248 0.9 3.7 3.3 560 4.6 50 414.9 2579.1 201.7 
Solomon-I 1 1569 42.5 2.8 3.0 577 36.8 310 63.9 153.2 31.6 
Somalia 10 521 65.1 2.0 2.8 108 20.8 1062 0.0 17.8 2.2 
49 
 
Sri Lanka 20 3022 3.1 3.4 3.0 90 3.0 1815 73.5 36.6 247.0 
St. Helena 0 40014 0.4 4.9 4.9 12986 32.5 65 0.0   
St. Kitts-N 0 13763 1.0 4.2 3.7 449 3.3 24 0.0 2112.5 879.7 
St. Lucia 0 7116 2.6 3.9 3.3 164 2.3 29 0.0 584.7 163.5 
St. Vincent-G 0 6304 2.7 3.8 3.3 209 3.3 23 0.0 979.2 274.5 
Suriname 1 8696 1.5 3.5 3.4 145 1.7 76 277.1 61.3 10.6 
Thailand 67 5405 1.8 3.9 3.3 8 0.1 540 1.8 156.3 63.7 
Timor-Leste 1 983 4.9 2.7 3.0 305 31.0 339 50.8 40.2 97.2 
Tokelau 0 36663 0.5 5.1 5.1 11507 31.4 17 0.0   
Tonga 0 3875 7.5 3.6 3.3 825 21.3 86 3.1 41.4 894.6 
Trinidad-T 1 17435 0.6 4.0 3.4 1 0.0 2 22.5 1037.1 86.7 
Tunisia 11 4212 2.7 3.7 3.1 171 4.1 1829 47.5 110.7 198.6 
Turkey 74 10123 1.2 4.0 3.3 62 0.6 4560 53.3 161.7 25.3 
Turkmenistan 5 5708 2.5 2.4 2.4 9 0.2 47 319.3 721.9 7.1 
Tuvalu 0 3584 7.1 3.0 2.9 3514 98.1 35 0.0 76.2 431.2 
Ukraine 46 3386 3.8 3.2 2.8 27 0.8 1215 40.8 136.0 168.0 
Uruguay 3 13499 1.2 4.1 3.5 18 0.1 60 218.8 714.4 35.5 
Vanuatu 0 3042 18.0 3.4 3.2 668 22.0 162 7.3 228.3 75.0 
Venezuela 29 12181 1.2 2.7 2.5 2 0.0 48 65.4 91.3 4.4 
Wallis-F 0 41911 0.4 4.7 4.7 11174 26.7 128 0.0   








Table A6: Actual and optimal aid to borderline orphans 
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GDP, % 
























Pakistan 174 1165 27 2.3 4724 83 7.1 14383 0 20577 9659 -4724 15852 
Vietnam 88 1554 65 4.2 5715 135 8.7 11831 0 22479 6117 -5715 16764 
Nigeria 164 2328 21 0.9 3405 53 2.3 8647 0 49705 5243 -3405 46301 
Ghana 25 1495 74 5 1857 250 16.7 6239 0 8917 4382 -1857 7060 
Myanmar 52 1264 38 3 2005 78 6.2 4065 0 7590 2060 -2005 5585 
Cameroon 21 1225 63 5.1 1323 118 9.6 2489 349 3829 1166 -974 2507 
Mozambique 25 515 114 22.2 2856 157 30.5 3936 2316 5308 1079 -540 2451 
Rwanda 11 607 124 20.4 1311 193 31.7 2032 1182 2825 721 -129 1514 
Madagascar 22 439 32 7.2 688 61 14 1333 591 2263 645 -96 1575 
PNG 7 1746 109 6.2 763 200 11.4 1397 547 1838 635 -216 1075 
Chad 12 929 63 6.8 781 108 11.6 1326 0 2141 545 -781 1360 
Cambodia 15 874 93 10.6 1358 126 14.4 1840 651 2373 483 -707 1015 
Nepal 27 631 61 9.7 1669 77 12.2 2084 598 3844 414 -1072 2175 
Niger 17 377 80 21.2 1358 101 26.7 1711 1021 2154 352 -338 796 
Sierra Leone 6 568 103 18.2 612 145 25.6 859 424 1087 247 -187 475 
Laos 6 1309 97 7.4 620 129 9.8 820 464 1237 200 -156 618 
Tajikistan 8 854 68 8 529 93 10.8 718 0 1331 190 -529 802 
Eritrea 5 467 23 4.9 108 59 12.7 279 0 462 171 -108 354 
DRC 68 350 35 10.1 2400 38 10.7 2557 0 4828 157 -2400 2428 
Malawi 15 431 101 23.4 1538 111 25.8 1695 1078 2109 157 -459 572 
Togo 7 548 50 9 325 64 11.7 421 106 800 95 -220 475 
Nicaragua 6 1657 131 7.9 762 143 8.6 831 0 1338 69 -762 576 
Guinea 11 463 44 9.6 502 50 10.7 564 93 1133 62 -409 631 
Guinea-Bissau 2 572 62 10.8 103 85 14.9 143 8 215 40 -95 111 
Mauritania 4 1300 175 13.4 643 184 14.2 679 0 776 35 -643 132 
Gambia 2 524 128 24.4 224 129 24.7 227 119 281 3 -105 57 
All 798    38179   73107 9547 151442 34928 -28632 113263 
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Table A7: Actual and optimal aid to Borderline Darlings 









Actual aid / 
GDP, % 
























Morocco 33 2979 102 3.4 3314 0 0 0 0 5044 3314 -1730 3314 
Indonesia 245 3274 11 0.3 2664 0 0 0 0 23318 2664 -20654 2664 
Sudan 37 1518 71 4.7 2606 0 0 0 0 3036 2606 -430 2606 
Philippines 95 2349 18 0.8 1742 0 0 0 0 16482 1742 -14740 1742 
Syria 20 1217 88 7.3 1786 10 0.8 208 0 3004 1578 -1218 1786 
South Africa 52 7172 30 0.4 1527 0 0 0 0 8760 1527 -7232 1527 
Zimbabwe 14 759 86 11.4 1233 0 0 0 0 1519 1233 -287 1233 
South Sudan 11 1327 113 8.5 1191 0 0 0 0 1209 1191 -18 1191 
Georgia 4 3563 242 6.8 938 0 0 0 0 1807 938 -869 938 
Uzbekistan 29 1540 26 1.7 769 8 0.5 241 0 2783 528 -2014 769 
Armenia 3 3348 158 4.7 469 0 0 0 0 852 469 -383 469 
Namibia 2 5181 185 3.6 416 0 0 0 0 1332 416 -917 416 
Honduras 8 2232 102 4.6 781 48 2.2 369 0 1596 412 -815 781 
El Salvador 6 3744 51 1.4 309 0 0 0 0 1212 309 -903 309 
Bhutan 1 2262 502 22.2 367 178 7.9 130 0 408 237 -41 367 
Kyrgyzstan 6 1067 159 14.9 880 126 11.8 698 0 1100 182 -220 880 
Botswana 2 6511 80 1.2 168 0 0 0 0 1846 168 -1679 168 
Swaziland 1 3473 100 2.9 121 0 0 0 0 465 121 -344 121 
Burundi 10 230 67 29.2 657 55 23.9 539 198 657 118 0 459 
North Korea 25 1137 4 0.4 108 0 0 0 0 3464 108 -3355 108 
CAR 5 436 77 17.7 349 55 12.6 249 24 423 101 -73 326 
Moldova 4 1884 165 8.7 587 150 7.9 533 0 923 54 -336 587 
Comoros 1 767 145 18.9 104 77 10.1 55 0 104 48 -1 104 
Cote d'Ivoire 21 1286 85 6.6 1753 84 6.6 1741 0 3442 12 -1689 1753 





Table A8: Aid volumes and poverty reducing efficiency for individual donors 














      
All Donors Total 149389 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.00 
      
Old aid 122279 104.3 102.9 105.6 85.38 
      
DAC bilateral donors 68090 90.5 89.4 94.9 41.23 
Australia 2706 29.1 22.3 66.3 0.53 
Austria 281 85.5 65.8 106.3 0.16 
Belgium 872 351.5 128.2 512.1 2.05 
Canada 2046 166.3 140.4 189.5 2.28 
Denmark 1209 142.4 112.9 190.1 1.15 
Finland 528 135.6 124.2 155.7 0.48 
France 6331 53.1 49.0 67.9 2.25 
Germany 6876 69.1 64.2 72.9 3.18 
Greece 64 20.9 10.1 31.5 0.01 
Ireland 430 281.3 204.9 334.5 0.81 
Italy 543 111.6 85.9 123.7 0.41 
Japan 12445 50.0 42.1 84.0 4.17 
Korea 1625 89.6 81.0 117.6 0.98 
Luxembourg 198 148.2 127.7 189.6 0.20 
Netherlands 1309 191.8 150.8 225.2 1.68 
New Zealand 243 10.7 6.3 30.7 0.02 
Norway 1841 128.9 105.2 141.7 1.59 
Portugal 358 223.4 108.4 329.4 0.54 
Spain 1469 77.8 61.6 83.8 0.76 
Sweden 1455 141.3 122.1 164.1 1.38 
Switzerland 1063 108.4 95.5 120.8 0.77 
United Kingdom 3186 154.1 139.3 174.5 3.29 
United States 21012 89.3 87.2 93.1 12.57 
      
European Commission 19007 66.9 58.1 69.7 8.51 
      
United Nations 2905 139.7 113.0 161.0 2.72 
International Fund for Agric. 735 180.3 153.7 203.6 0.89 
Joint United Nations Program 60 123.0 101.8 135.1 0.05 
United Nations Childrens Fun 563 221.3 142.2 282.0 0.83 
United Nations Development P 384 182.9 129.6 207.3 0.47 
United Nations Economic Comm 0.008 2.4 0.6 14.5 0.00 
United Nations High Commissi 203 78.2 63.1 113.2 0.11 
United Nations Peacebuilding 60 111.6 41.6 165.8 0.04 
United Nations Population Fund 267 125.0 102.8 142.0 0.22 
United Nations Relief and Wo 508 2.6 0.1 18.5 0.01 
World Health Organization 124 112.1 94.4 125.9 0.09 
      
World Bank 14255 194.1 177.7 203.2 18.52 
      
International Monetary Fund 1325 111.2 92.1 173.8 0.99 
      
Regional development banks 7561 125.0 115.1 138.7 6.33 
African Development Bank 20 78.6 50.6 128.1 0.01 
African Development Fund 2536 300.3 235.3 317.3 5.10 
Asian Development Bank 3293 30.7 9.5 100.6 0.68 
Inter-American Development Bank 1284 8.2 2.8 35.0 0.07 
Islamic Development Bank 428 164.6 141.5 186.4 0.47 
      
Other Multilaterals (excl. Vertical Funds) 2243 62.2 56.2 67.5 0.93 
Arab Bank for Economic Devel 194 270.7 198.1 293.3 0.35 
Arab Fund for Economic  Soci 1318 7.2 2.3 27.5 0.06 
Global Green Growth Institute 5 177.3 102.9 228.6 0.01 
Nordic Development Fund 30 271.6 161.5 387.5 0.06 
OPEC Fund for International  637 106.4 95.2 118.6 0.45 
Organization for Security an 57 8.5 0.6 26.5 0.00 
      
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 6893 133.4 102.7 157.0 6.15 
Action Aid 119 168.8 125.0 204.4 0.13 
Adra 560 181.6 131.5 198.0 0.68 
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Broederlijkdelen 8 140.6 61.3 213.9 0.01 
Brot für die Welt 40 94.9 82.9 107.8 0.03 
Cafod 42 91.7 81.8 114.7 0.03 
Care 779 161.0 143.8 174.7 0.84 
Caritas Switzerland 48 121.5 90.9 169.4 0.04 
CCF 184 124.6 97.1 146.9 0.15 
Christian Aid 22 105.9 81.5 193.3 0.02 
Church of Sweden 39 70.8 61.6 95.6 0.02 
Concern 116 194.9 128.4 227.2 0.15 
Cord Aid 153 97.9 64.0 122.1 0.10 
Devp Canada 21 76.2 4.0 118.8 0.01 
Diakona 15 77.1 63.7 105.0 0.01 
EED 93 99.9 74.3 142.0 0.06 
FES 53 41.6 31.2 68.3 0.01 
Ford Foundation 120 82.3 59.2 108.5 0.07 
Goal 77 279.5 149.3 309.4 0.14 
Handicap International 68 151.3 100.0 204.2 0.07 
Helvetas 8 154.6 110.5 169.4 0.01 
Hivos 48 74.9 57.9 106.2 0.02 
ICCO 97 100.1 81.9 112.7 0.07 
ICRC 743 92.2 24.7 184.9 0.46 
IPPF 27 139.1 107.4 171.9 0.02 
Kellog 124 24.7 16.5 59.9 0.02 
Kinder not Hilfe 52 115.1 86.6 145.3 0.04 
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 44 23.6 10.3 40.7 0.01 
KOO 72 97.2 85.6 110.8 0.05 
Marie Stopes International 14 215.2 157.3 361.5 0.02 
Mcarthur 32 30.8 25.1 44.1 0.01 
Mercy Corps 23 23.0 10.5 112.8 0.00 
Misereor 142 62.2 53.6 82.7 0.06 
MSF 729 204.2 76.5 325.7 1.00 
Norwegian Church Aid 80 124.9 76.1 134.5 0.07 
Norwegian Peoples Aid 87 77.4 62.2 102.5 0.05 
Novib 54 165.2 114.1 219.4 0.06 
Oxfam 140 37.3 28.3 48.4 0.04 
Plan International 43 81.3 58.3 121.5 0.02 
PSI 10 108.0 82.6 129.6 0.01 
Rockefeller 229 168.8 141.6 207.0 0.26 
SNV 80 160.2 120.0 209.3 0.09 
Soros 146 205.0 135.8 254.0 0.20 
STC 115 137.2 105.9 176.9 0.11 
Swiss Aid 26 48.1 31.8 113.8 0.01 
Swiss Contact 22 98.4 68.2 119.0 0.01 
TDHCH 43 60.0 50.0 72.5 0.02 
TDHNL 14 37.8 23.1 113.1 0.00 
Trocaire 59 154.0 112.2 182.6 0.06 
Vredeseilanden 10 150.6 59.6 260.6 0.01 
VSO UK 364 114.7 92.3 145.6 0.28 
Water Aid 53 118.5 94.8 128.4 0.04 
Welt Hunger Hilfe 127 271.6 93.1 430.6 0.23 
Woordendaad 22 81.3 61.5 131.4 0.01 
World Vision 456 78.9 65.8 91.9 0.24 
      
New aid 27110 80.5 74.7 87.0 14.62 
      
Non-DAC bilateral donors 21382 63.5 55.0 73.8 9.09 
Brazil 146 285.7 138.7 415.2 0.28 
Bulgaria 0.2 3.0 0.3 48.6 0.00 
Chile 2 20.5 14.8 37.2 0.00 
China 7006 153.0 128.3 183.3 7.17 
Colombia 9 2.2 0.0 99.2 0.00 
Croatia 1 0.009 0.0005 16.2 0.00 
Czech Republic 43 59.9 39.8 71.1 0.02 
Estonia 13 14.0 7.4 29.8 0.00 
      
Hungary 8 5.1 1.9 16.1 0.00 
Iceland 14 347.8 207.2 450.0 0.03 
India 981 46.9 33.1 63.8 0.31 
Israel 108 52.0 26.9 59.3 0.04 
Kazakhstan 1 0.9 0.2 12.6 0.00 
Kuwait 1389 44.5 35.9 51.2 0.41 
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Latvia 1 9.9 3.4 36.5 0.00 
Liechtenstein 3 59.9 31.2 81.1 0.00 
Lithuania 2 1.7 0.7 12.6 0.00 
Monaco 5 272.1 198.0 334.5 0.01 
Poland 128 8.4 6.2 23.4 0.01 
Qatar 1741 2.2 0.4 19.7 0.03 
Russia 220 42.4 34.9 74.3 0.06 
Saudi Arabia 5109 10.4 4.2 30.1 0.36 
Slovak Republic 9 17.9 11.8 45.7 0.00 
Slovenia 11 18.1 9.1 23.6 0.00 
South Africa 36 209.4 76.3 367.0 0.05 
Taiwan 31 41.4 26.0 68.8 0.01 
Thailand 4 44.9 22.3 111.7 0.00 
Turkey 1559 11.1 6.6 44.0 0.12 
United Arab Emirates 2800 9.8 5.4 21.6 0.18 
      
New global actors 5729 144.1 134.6 162.1 5.53 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization 1140 195.9 171.2 207.8 1.50 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 2934 141.3 126.5 171.6 2.78 
Global Environment Facility 959 73.2 61.4 80.8 0.47 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 696 168.9 134.5 223.7 0.79 
Notes: All volumes in the first column, except the new financial flows, refer to aid; The average poverty reducing efficiency for all donors is 
set to 100; The upper and lower bounds are derived from the sensitivity analysis; Column 5 gives the proportion of total poverty reduction – 




Appendix B: Calibration of the model 
This section elaborates on the calibration of the theoretical model. Specifically, we discuss the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to realized per-capita-income (𝛼𝛼), the relationship between a 
country’s policy and its saturation point (𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) and the fraction of the first aid-dollar that is not 
lost due to transaction costs (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖). We establish the benchmark values (as well as values to use 
in the sensitivity analysis) of the parameters that are a part of the concerned functions and that 
will be used in the calibrations of our model, and describe necessary transformations of key 
indicators. 
 
 B1. The elasticity of poverty with respect to realized per-capita-income, 𝛼𝛼 
In the benchmark setup we assume and that the elasticity of poverty with respect to realized 
per capita income, denoted 𝛼𝛼, is 1.5. We base this figure on previous empirical literature in the 
area. In particular, Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) estimate the average total growth elasticity 
of poverty (as measured by the proportion of individuals below $1.25 a day) over the period 
1981-2010 to be around 1.5. Based on a careful review of the literature, they note that most 
estimates of  𝛼𝛼 lie in the range of 1-2 (See e.g. World Bank, 2000; Bourguignon, 2003; Ferreira 
and Ravallion, 2009; Ravallion, 2012). Collier and Dollar (2002), finally, use 𝛼𝛼=2.0. Against 
this background, we use 𝛼𝛼 = 1.5 as benchmark, and 1.0 respective 2.0 in the robustness analysis.  
 
 B2. The saturation point for a country with average policy, 𝛽𝛽0 
Just as the standard assumption of diminishing returns in the aid-growth literature, we assume 
a quadratic relationship between aid and realized income, i.e. that recipient country 
governments have limited absorptive capacity when it comes to delivering consumption just as 
in delivering economic growth. With large aid volumes, a recipient country will reach a point 
where they can no longer absorb or spend aid efficiently.  
 In our benchmark calibration, we assume that the saturation point for a country with 
average policy score, which we denote 𝛽𝛽0, occurs when aid constitutes 25 percent of GDP. As 
noted in Section 3, we base this figure on the estimates in Clemens et al (2012), who find 
inflection points for the aid-growth relationship when aid exceeds about 20-25 percent of GDP. 
This would suggest a reasonable benchmark estimate of 𝛽𝛽0  is 22.5 percent. Since we do not 
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use the same aid measure as Clemens et al (2002), however, we need to transform their 
estimates to a saturation point that is relevant in our setup. To begin with, we use aid 
commitments rather than actual disbursements. Furthermore, unlike Clemens et al., we include 
aid from NGOs, non-DAC bilateral donors and ‘New global actors’. While the latter two posts 
were negligible during their period under study (1970-2005), we need to adjust for the fact that 
they omitted aid from NGOs. Finally, we drop the part of reported aid that does not involve an 
actual transfer of money (e.g. administrative costs, see Section 4). Based on aid commitments 
being 20.8 percent higher than net aid disbursements, aid from NGOs being 5.9 percent of 
‘traditional aid’, and the aid posts that we drop being 10.4 percent of (reported) aid, we 
conclude that a saturation point of 22.5 percent in Clemens et al. (2012) correspond to a 
saturation point of approximately 25 percent with our measure.18 To evaluate the sensitivity of 
results to using alternative saturation points, we use 𝛽𝛽0=20 and 𝛽𝛽0=30 percent in alternative 
calibrations.  
 
 B3 The saturation point 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and the fraction of the first aid-dollar that is not lost due to 
transaction costs, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
As noted, we set the saturation point for a country with average policy, 𝛽𝛽0, to 25 percent in our 
benchmark estimations. Like Collier and Dollar (2002), however, we also let country i’s 
saturation point 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 and the fraction of its first aid-dollar that is not lost to transaction costs, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, 
vary with policy. Based on their theoretical model, we derive the functional form for this 
relationship, and based on their empirical results, we arrive at the parameter estimates to use in 
the benchmark and sensitivity analysis.  
 The saturation point, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖, and the fraction of the first aid-dollar that is not lost due to 
transaction costs, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖, enter our theoretical model in equation (3). Below, we show how we 
derive this equation from Collier and Dollar (2002). In their setup:  
 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
= 𝑏𝑏3 + 𝑏𝑏5𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 2𝑏𝑏4𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 (B1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 denotes Policy (below, we return to how this is measured) in country i. Based on 
average Policy, 𝐶𝐶�, and the standard deviation of Policy, 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅, we construct the following 
variable transformation to define Normalized Policy in country i, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖: 
 






     (B2) 
Combining equation (B1) and (B2) we get: 
 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖






𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖)   (B3) 
We now define the following variable transformations: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 =
𝑏𝑏5𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅
𝑏𝑏3+𝑏𝑏5𝑃𝑃�
     (B4) 
  𝜂𝜂 = −𝑏𝑏3+𝑏𝑏5𝑃𝑃
�
2𝑏𝑏4
     (B5) 
𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 refers to a ‘Policy Factor’. Based on equations (B3) – (B5) we can write: 
 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
= (𝑏𝑏3 + 𝑏𝑏5𝐶𝐶�)�1 +  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖�(1 −
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
�1+ 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖�𝜂𝜂
)   (B6) 
From equation (B6) we see that the saturation point is �1 +  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖�𝜂𝜂. This implies that for a 
country with average policy (𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 = 0), the saturation point is given by 𝜂𝜂. We already have a 
value for the saturation point for a country with average policy – that is, 𝛽𝛽0 – and can thus 
replace 𝜂𝜂 with 𝛽𝛽0 in equation (B6). 
 We assume that policy has the same effect on 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 (the relationship between aid and realized 
per capita income) as on growth. The magnitude of 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 will, however, not be the same as the 
magnitude of 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
, since 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 and 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖 are measured in different units. In terms of magnitude, we 
must ensure that 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
≤ 1, so that one aid dollar never adds to realized income by more than one 
dollar. We therefore let 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 have the form as 𝜕𝜕𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
, but multiply it with a factor so that 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
 = 1 







    (B7) 
















 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 = �1 +  𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖�𝛽𝛽0     (B10) 






)     (B11) 




is Equation (3) in our theoretical model. So far, we have shown how to calibrate 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 based 
on Collier and Dollar (2002). We use equations (B2), (B4), (B9) and (B10) for the calibration. 
 Our benchmark estimate of 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 is based on the empirical results of Collier and Dollar 
(2002). Specifically, we used use their coefficient estimates for 𝑏𝑏3 and 𝑏𝑏5, as well as their 
measures of average Policy, 𝐶𝐶�, and the standard deviation of Policy, 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅.19 Plugging in 𝑏𝑏3 =
−0.54 , 𝑏𝑏5 = 0.31 , 𝐶𝐶� = 3.04 and 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 = 0.875 in equation (B4) we get our benchmark 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 =
0.67.  
 To get estimates of 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 for the sensitivity analysis, we follow the approach in Collier and 
Dollar (2002, p. 1481), changing their estimated coefficients of 𝑏𝑏3 and 𝑏𝑏5 by one standard 
deviation: 
 Lower bound: 𝑏𝑏3 + 𝑟𝑟.𝑎𝑎. (0.39); 𝑏𝑏5 − 𝑟𝑟.𝑎𝑎. (0.11) 
 Higher bound: 𝑏𝑏3 − 𝑟𝑟.𝑎𝑎. (0.39); 𝑏𝑏5 + 𝑟𝑟. 𝑎𝑎. (0.11) 
Doing so, we get 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 = 0.38 as lower bound and 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 = 1.06 as higher bound for the sensitivity 
analysis. 
 We calculate 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 using equation (B2), where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 refer to actual values 
in the policy index we are using (ACPR in the benchmark setup, CPR in the sensitivity 
analysis). 𝐶𝐶� and 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 are transformations of the values used in the Collier and Dollar (2002) 
study, (𝐶𝐶� = 3.04  and 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 = 0.875) into the index we are using. We elaborate on these 
transformations in the next section. Finally, given 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥, and 𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓 (and 𝛽𝛽0 from Clemens 
et al., 2012), we calculate 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 using equations (B9) and (B10). 
 
 
19 𝑏𝑏3 = −0.54 and 𝑏𝑏5 = 0.31 are found  in Column 1 in their Table 1  on page 1479, 𝐶𝐶� = 3.04 is found on page 
1482, and 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 = 0.875 is from Table 2 on page 1481.  
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 B4 Adjusting for the use of different policy indicators  
To calculate Normalized Policy, 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑖𝑖, we compare the policy score for each country in our 
dataset to the average and the standard deviation of the policy score in the dataset of Collier 
and Dollar (2002). Doing so, however, we need to adjust for the fact that we use different policy 
indicators. In particular, to integrate structural economic vulnerability and low human capital 
into the allocation rule, we use the ACPR in our benchmark calibration (and CPR in the 
sensitivity analysis). Collier and Dollar (2002), on the other hand, used the unweighted average 
of the components in the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
measure. This contrasts with both the CPR, which is a weighted average of the components in 
CPIA, and the ACPR, which is an index made up of CPR together with measures of 
vulnerability. We thus need to transform the average and standard deviation (𝐶𝐶� = 3.04  and 
𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅 = 0.875) from the Collier and Dollar (2002) policy index into the scale of the ACPR and 
CPR, respectively.20 We carry out this transformation in two steps: 
 In a first step, we account for the fact that before 1998 the CPIA was measured on a scale 
from 1-5 and after that on a scale from 1-6 (Gonzalez and Nishiuchi, 2018). With the new scale, 
both average and median CPIA scores increased from 3.0 in the 1977-1997 period to 3.5 in the 








⇒ 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1.25𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 0.25    (B12) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 refers the policy measure used by Collier and Dollar (2002), and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 refers to 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 transformed into the 1-6 points scale. From this, we find that: 
 𝐶𝐶�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1.25𝐶𝐶�𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 0.25 = 3.5500   (B13) 
 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1.25𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 1.0938     (B14) 
In a second step, we transform 𝐶𝐶�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 and 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 into the scale of the ACPR and the CPR, 
respectively. Here we need to introduce some new notations. 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 refer to our 
respective policy measures. 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,09−13 refers to a policy measure constructed as the one used 
in Collier and Dollar (2002), but for our 2009-2013 dataset. Finally, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 refer to 
 
20 Please note that the result of this transformation will not be the same as the average and standard deviation of 
ACPR (respective CPR) in our 2009-2013 dataset. 
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the transformed versions of the Collier and Dollar (2002) Policy Index. All these indicators – 
𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓,09−13, 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 and 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 – are measured on a 1-6 points scale. 
 In order to transform 𝐶𝐶�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 into 𝐶𝐶�𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 (and correspondingly, 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 into 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅) we 
multiply 𝐶𝐶�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 by the scaling factor 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅
��������
𝑃𝑃�𝑁𝑁𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁,09−13
. Doing the same for the average and standard 
deviation of CPR we thus calculate: 












1.0938 = 0.59   (B16) 












1.0938 = 1.02    (B18) 
Based on these, we calculate the maximum policy values in our dataset (note that it is pure 
coincidence that 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 happen to get the same numerical value): 
 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 5.10     (B19) 
 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 = 5.10     (B20) 
Finally, we combine equation (B2) with equations (B15) – (B20) to get the normalized policy 



































AidData (2014a) “Saudi Arabia TUFF Donor Dataset, Version 1.0”, available at: 
https://www.aiddata.org/data/saudi-arabia-tuff-donor-dataset-level-1-v1-0  
AidData (2014b) “Qatar TUFF Donor Dataset, Version 1.0”, available at: 
https://www.aiddata.org/data/qatar-tuff-donor-dataset-level-1-v1-0  
AidData (2017a) “AidDataCore_ResearchRelease_Level1_v3.0 Research Releases dataset”, 
Williamsburg, VA : AidData, available at: https://www.aiddata.org/data/aiddata-core-
research-release-level-1-v3-0 
AidData (2017b) “Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1.0”. available at: 
http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset. 
Alvaredo, F. and L. Gasparini (2015) “Recent trends in inequality and poverty in developing 
countries”, in Handbook of income distribution, Volume 2, 2015, Pages 697-805,  
Elsevier, Edited by Edited by  A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon 
Bourguignon, F. (2003) “The growth elasticity of poverty reduction: Explaining heterogeneity 
across countries and time periods”, in Eichler and Turnovsky (eds). Inequality and 
Growth: Theory and Policy Implications. CESifo Seminar Series, London: MIT Press. 
Ferreira, F. and Ravallion, M. (2009). Poverty and inequality: The global context. In Salverda, 
Nolan and Smeeding (eds). The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Gonzalez, Christian Yves and Toru Nishiuchi (2018) “Revisiting the relevance of the World 
Bank’s Country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) on growth”, Discussion paper, 
MTI Global practice, no 9, December 2018, the World Bank Group. 
Guillaumont, P., S. Guillaumont Jenneney and L. Wagner (2017a) “How to take into account 
vulnerability in aid allocation criteria and lack of human capital as well: improving the 
performance based allocation”, World Development, vol 90. pp. 27-40. 
IDA (2017a) “Country Policy and Institutional Assessment”. Downloaded 171004. Available 
at: https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment 
IDA (2017b) “IDA Country Performance Ratings (CPR) Historical series: CPR 2006-2012. 





International Committee of the Red Cross (2014) “ICRC Annual Report 2013”, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2013) “ICRC Annual Report 2012”, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2012) “ICRC Annual Report 2011”, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2011) “ICRC Annual Report 2010”, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
International Committee of the Red Cross (2010) “ICRC Annual Report 2009”, Geneva, 
Switzerland. 
Koch, Dirk-Jan; Axel Dreher; Rainer Thiele and Peter Nunnenkamp (2009) “Keeping a Low 
Profile: What Determines the Allocation of Aid by Non-Governmental Organizations?” 
World Development, 37(5), pp. 902-918. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2014) “International Financial Report 2013”, Geneva, MSF 
International. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2013) “International Financial Report 2012”, Geneva, MSF 
International. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2012) “International Financial Report 2011”, Geneva, MSF 
International. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2011) “International Financial Report 2010”, Geneva, MSF 
International. 
Médecins Sans Frontières (2010) “International Financial Report 2009”, Geneva, MSF 
International. 
OECD-DAC (2020) “Aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]”, 
TABLE2A_30072020074834372.csv Downloaded 200730. Available at: 
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=Table2A 
Ravallion, M. and S. Chen (1997) “What can new survey data tell us about recent changes in 
distribution and poverty?”, World Bank Economic Review, 11 (2), 357-382 
Ravallion, M. (2012) “Why don’t we see poverty convergence?”, American Economic Review 
102(1). 
United Nations (2019a) “LDC data”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Economic 




UNDP (2016) ”Human Development Index (HDI)”. Downloaded 161222. Available at:  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
World Bank (2000) “World Development Report: Attacking Poverty”, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
World Bank (2019b) “World Development Indicators”, available at: 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/world-development-indicators. 
World Bank (2019c) “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, available at 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/worldwide-governance-
indicators/resource/d048db01-0a66-485b-96a3-db28287b7a65  
 
 
 
 
